

VALUES, INSTITUTIONAL DALITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN PORTUGAL

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The purpose of this study has been to arrive at an authoritative and nuanced assessment of the functioning and quality of Portuguese institutions through an intensive analysis of organizations and agencies deemed emblematic of the nation's Institutional framework. For this purpose, the project drew on prior theoretical work that sought to arrive at a rigorous and measurable definition of "institution" and prior empirical research that developed a methodology for analyzing real existing institutions and assessing their bearing on national social and economic progress. Given the impossibility of investigating all Portuguese institutions, the study selected a sample of organizations of national scope, public and private, that are both intrinsically important and capable of casting light on the character on the broader national institutional universe.

This final report is based on findings from year-long studies of six such institutions conducted at the same time and with the same methodology. That methodology is described in the following section. Investigators were asked not only to provide historical background and detailed analysis of the internal structure and modes of operation of each organization, but to rank them in a series of strategic dimensions of institutional quality drawn from previous theoretical literature in economics and sociology. These are also described next. This body of new knowledge allows us to go beyond stereotypical characterizations of Portuguese institutions or reputational "scores", such as those used by major international agencies, and arrive at a deeper understanding of the dynamics and constraints faced by the leaders and personnel of each agency.

Overall, and to anticipate subsequent findings, we can say that results of these studies are generally positive. Despite serious constraints, in part brought about by the vast economic crisis that affected the country in recent years, organizations were able to fulfill their institutional blueprints, meeting the goals for which they were created. Their contributions to good governance and national development in their respective spheres of activity, while also generally positive, varied in effectiveness and reach depending on the character of the institutional leadership and the shifting state policies to which they were subjected. These constraints will become clear as we delve into results of the individual studies.

Background: the Institutional "Turn"


Recent years have brought an unexpected convergence in economics and sociology in their respective approaches to national development. This convergence has pivoted around the concept of "institutions", a familiar term in sociology and anthropology but something of a revolution in economics, dominated so far by the neo-classical paradigm. It took the influence of two Nobel Prize winners in economics, Douglass North and Joseph Stiglitz, to bring about this major conceptual turn. When North (1990) declared that "institutions matter", they actually started to be taken into account. Stiglitz chimed in declaring that "development is no longer seen as a process of capital accumulation, but as a process of organizational change" (Hoff and Stiglitz 2001: 389).

Unfortunately, this significant theoretical innovation was accompanied by much confusion about what the concept of "institutions" meant and by an empirical literature that, lacking a clear theoretical referent, careened into tautologies. North (1990: 3) defined institutions as "any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interactions", a vague definition that encompasses everything from norms learned during the process of socialization to physical force. Not surprisingly, the subsequent empirical literature conflated "institution" with values, norms, property laws, and actual agencies such as central banks (Haggard 2004; Williamson 1985). That empirical literature eventually settled on reputational scores compiled by international organizations, like the World Bank, or "country risk" agencies for which the entire institutional framework of a particular country could be summarized by a single number (Knack and Keefer 1995; Jutting. 2003).

Conceptual Definition

In order to overcome the theoretical confusion surrounding the meaning of the concept, the study drew on prior work grounded on classic sociological theory that sought to separate the distinct elements of culture and social structure and to arrange them in a causal hierarchy from "deep" forces, such as "values" in the culture and "power" in the social structure, and the more visible elements of social life. This analysis, published previously (Portes 2006; Portes and Smith 2012), led to the summary conceptual schema reproduced in Figure 1. According to this conceptual analysis, institutions represent *the symbolic blueprints for organizations*: they are the set of rules, written or informal, governing relationships among role occupants in social organizations like the family, schools, corporations, and all other major areas of organizational life: the economy, the polity, religion, communications and information and leisure (MacIver and Page 1961; Merton 1968a; Hollingsworth 2002; Portes 2010: Ch. 4).

Figure 1 Elements of Social Life and Placement of the Concept



This definition of institutions is in close agreement with everyday usage of the term, as when one speaks of "institutional blueprints". However, its validity does not depend on this overlap, but on its analytic utility. Concepts are mental constructs whose usefulness is given by their capacity to guide our understanding of social phenomena. The proposed definition deliberately limits the scope of the concept, while systematically relating it to other elements of social life. It thus gives us the necessary leverage to understand phenomena that otherwise would be obscured.

For example, the distinction between organizations and the institutions that underlie them provides the necessary leverage for analyzing how events actually occur in social life. For it is not the case that once institutional roles are established, role occupants blindly follow them. Instead, they modify these roles in their daily application, substitute them, or even by-pass them. Thus, the relationship between institutional rules and real organizations is not straightforward. Borrowing a concept originally introduced by Polanyi (1947; 1957), Granovetter (1985; 1995) analyzed this issue as the problem of "social embeddedness": the extent to which institutional blueprints and organizations actually overlap is an empirical question and, as we shall see, constitutes one of the core topics of institutional analysis.

Literature Review

North's pronouncements concerning the role of institutions on development were followed by a surge of studies, historical and contemporary, on the role of various social forces, collectively lumped under the same umbrella term. Among the most influential was the study by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000) that focused on the path dependence of legal frameworks created by European colonists in their areas of concentration. Colonies where Europeans created permanent settlements developed solid institutional frameworks copied from the mother countries that, in turn, created the basis for sustained economic development. Aware of the perennial endogeneity problem between institutions and development, Acemoglu *et al.* instrumented their main determinant – European settler concentration – on prior reported death rates among early colonists, soldiers, and even bishops. They reasoned that areas where high death rates were reported among early settlers because of malaria and yellow fever were abandoned to play an exclusively extractive role and that only healthier ones were conducive to concentrated settlement by Europeans.

Like almost all studies in this field, Acemoglu et al. depended for their measure of institutional quality on reputational indices that assign a single score per country. In their case, they drew on Political Risk Services Inc. for a measure of "average protection against expropriation," supplemented by a measure of "constraints on the executive" taken from the Polity III data by Gurr. The industry standard in this field appears to be the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) compiled by Knack and Keefer (1995). Another important measure is the Rule of Law Index employed, among others, in Dollar and Kraay's (2002) influential study. As Jutting (2003: 19) notes in his review of this literature: "Nearly all the studies use as a proxy for 'institutions' variables that measure the quality and performance of institutions rather than the institution itself." These reputational measures risk tautology, because the assembled opinions on "institutional quality" can be influenced by the level of economic development already achieved by different countries.

A more nuanced, sociological account of the role of institutions on development was provided by Nee and Opper (2009). After carefully building a Weberian ideal-type of bureaucracy, they went on to argue that it is the quality of this apparatus, not legal formal protections of shareholders that fosters long-term capitalist development.

The lower the bureaucratic quality, the higher the level of uncertainty faced by economic actors and the less the calculability in both short and long term planning (Nee and Opper 2009: 299).

To buttress this argument, these authors also relied on an index of "government effectiveness" compiled by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2005) that, because of its numerous indicators and inclusion of objective measures, is believed to provide "the least noisy signal of the underlying notion of bureaucratic quality" (Nee and Opper 2009: 301). Unsurprisingly, African countries, such as Nigeria, rank at the very bottom of this scale, while the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries rank at the top. Predictably, the index has a strong positive "effect" on capitalistic development.

Reviewing this literature, a strong sense emerges that studies at closer range are needed to develop nuance and bar tautology. It is possible that not all governmental agencies and other institutions in Nigeria are hopeless; nor are all Dutch and Scandinavian ones necessarily paragons of excellence. Seeking to move beyond this literature, we draw on the theoretical analysis synthesized in Figure 1 as the basis for conducting a study of real institutions at close range. Our aim is to identify a sample of Portuguese organizations of national scope, sufficiently important to tell us something about the character of the nation's institutional framework and the extent to which patterned differences exist within it.

Research Design

For this purpose, the study selected a set of six institutions from the public and private sectors. As noted previously, given the impossibility of covering the universe, we targeted organizations that are both intrinsically important and capable of reflecting broader trends in that universe.

These are:

- The Energy Corporation (Energias de Portugal EDP), one of the largest private companies in the nation in charge of the crucial task of generating and distributing electricity for the country. Originally, a state entity, EDP has been fully privatized with a present capitalization of close to 10 billion euros and a capacity of over 4,600 MW produced by more than fifty thermoelectric, hydraulic, and aeolic plants.
- The Food and Economic Security Authority (Autoridade de Segurança Alimentar e Económica ASAE). Founded as an agency of the Economy Ministry, ASAE has the mission of evaluating risks in the national food chain, monitoring and sanctioning violations in the production and commercialization of commodities, and protecting and informing the consuming public. It plays the decisive role in insuring that Portuguese hotels, supermarkets, and restaurants follow hygienic norms and standards in accordance with European Union rules.
- The Postal System (Correios de Portugal CTT). This is one of the oldest and most central public institutions bringing the presence of the state to the most remote corners of the country. With a history of five hundred years, the Portuguese mail expanded into the present complex of ten diversified service enterprises with over 14,000 employees covering both traditional mail distribution, electronic communications and transfers, and financial services of various kinds. Today, the CTT covers 100 percent of the national territory, administers a distribution chain of 200,000 kilometers, and delivers more than 5 million letters and parcels per day.
- The Public Health System (Serviço Nacional de Saúde SNS; Hospital de Santa Maria). The public health system mirrors faithfully the ideological and political currents of a nation (Pires 2013a, p.3). In Portugal, and

given the vastness of the system, it was studied through the prism of a large public hospital, the Hospital de Santa Maria (HSM), the anchoring unit of the North Lisbon Health District, providing care for a population of close to 400,000 and serving, simultaneously, as a university teaching hospital and an "end-of-the-line" unit for the treatment of rare and complex illnesses. The HSM employs close to 7,000 specialized workers, including more than 1,100 physicians, being currently one of the largest units in the Public Health's hospital system.

- The Stock Exchange (New York Stock Exchange Euronext Lisbon). Stock exchanges play a central role in capitalist economies as sources of finance for national enterprises and promoters of economic development. The extent to which they do so depends on their probity, transparency, and ability to attract firms supplementing or replacing other sources of finance. The Lisbon Exchange is currently part of Euronext that brought together the bourses of Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris and which was subsequently integrated into the New York Exchange. Today, the various markets grouped under NYSE Euronext Lisbon process more than 250,000 orders per second and are capable to provide more than 1,500,000 stock quotations per second. Stock market capitalization was estimated at 99.6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011, divided into 38 percent in obligations, 60 percent in stocks, and 2 percent in other instruments and certificates (Pompeia 2013b).
- The Tax Authority (Autoridade Tributária AT). The Tax Authority is a core part of the state apparatus insofar as it fulfills the mission of financing the rest of it. As Velasco (2008) has noted, the budget is really the core skeleton of the state, devoid of any pretenses. The extent to which tax authorities are able to fulfill their mission depends on their ability to enforce compliance and their capacity to persuade the citizenry of its civic obligation to pay. Both depend, in turn, on the quality of the organizations. In Portugal, tax collection is entrusted to the AT, a vast agency created in 2011 out of the fusion of the General Tax Directorate (DGCI); the General Customs Directorate (DGAIEC); and the Directorate of Informatics and Support to Tax and Customs Services (DGITA) (Evans 2013).

The research design for the study drew directly on a previous comparative project that produced detailed information on twenty-three institutions in five Latin American countries. The same methodology of data collection and reporting was implemented successfully in all these individual studies in Portugal. Several of the organizations and agencies studies in this prior

project – including stock exchanges, postal systems, and tax authorities – also form part of the present sample, providing direct points of comparison. Results of the earlier Latin American project have been published in three books and several articles (Portes 2009; Portes and Smith 2012; Rodriguez-Garavito and Portes 2012).

The methodology developed in the prior study consisted of recruiting teams of highly-trained and experienced local researchers and assigning to individual members responsibility for conducting year-long, in-depth studies of particular institutions. Two meetings were held by the entire team and the principal investigators during 2012-13 to monitor progress of fieldwork and seek to resolve difficulties and questions confronted during it. Individual investigators completed a mid-year progress report and a final report that includes detailed information on the history and performance of the respective organizations plus a set of binary and continuous rankings on criteria of institutional quality, discussed below.

Data collection for each study included the following:

- Compilation of the laws and legal codes creating the organization and defining its mission and activities
- Compilation of all internal reports and evaluations
- Compilation of relevant academic studies and press articles
- \bullet Interviews with organizational personnel at the levels of top and middle management 1
- Interviews with technicians and other functionnaries
- Interviews with outside informants
- Interviews with strategic users of services (i.e. pension funds investing in the stock market; mass marketers using the postal system; hospital patient advocates and representatives; taxpayer lobbies and monitoring committees)

By triangulating these diverse data sources after a full-year of fieldwork, investigators were able to arrive at authoritative assessments of the internal structure and operation of each organization and the extent to which it fulfills the goals for which it was created. These evaluations and the accompanying scores then provide the basis for inter-institutional comparisons and general conclusions. Table 1 presents a summary of the empirical fieldwork conducted for these studies.

^{1.} It was not possible to carry out these interviews in the Tax Authority because of the unresponsiveness of its leadership to take part in the study. In these conditions, the investigator in charge (Ana M. Evans) had to rely on interviews with outside informants and experts plus compilation of all available reports, press articles, and other library materials.

Table 1 Interviews and Secondary Data Collection Completed for Each Institutional Study

Institution	Interviews with top and middle management	Interviews with other personnel	Interviews with outside informants	Interviews with strategic users	Compilation of legal codes and internal reports	Compilation of academic studies and press articles
	#	#	#	#		
EDP Energias de Portugal	5	3	2	2	Completed	Completed
ASAE Autoridade Alimentar e Económica	16	21	2	6	Completed	Completed
CTT Correios de Portugal	12	3	4	01	Completed	Completed
HSM-SNS Hospital Santa Maria	14	10	4	1	Completed	Completed
LSE NYSE Euronext	4	0	2	2	Completed	Completed
AT Autoridade Tributária	1	0	8	14	Completed	Completed

¹⁾ Top managers indicated that information about "strategic" postal users was considered confidential. For the report, the investigator-in-charge used data from informants and relevant secondary reports from other sources.

An additional feature of the Portugal project, not included in its Latin American predecessors, is the conduct of surveys with personnel of the selected organizations to gauge their general value orientations as well as their attitudes toward the organization itself. Questionnaires were answered anonymously and with full guarantees of confidentiality. Surveys were completed with personnel of five of the six institutions selected for the project; details of their implementation and results will be described in a following section.

Hypotheses

From the research literature, we drew six factors that have been associated with bureaucratic quality and developmental performance in the past. The work of Rodrik *et al.* (2002) and Nee and Opper (2009) proved useful in this regard. The identified factors are not long-term historical forces, such as those examined by Acemoglu *et al.* (2001), but more proximate characteristics of institutional quality. For purposes of the study, *development* was defined as a composite of economic growth, social equity, and human rights (Sen 1999; Portes 1997). More broadly, the concept can be equated with sustained improvements in the well-being of a nation's population.

Investigators were asked to evaluate the extent to which each organization contributed to this goal *in its respective institutional sphere*. One cannot expect the postal system to improve university education or the civil aeronautics agency to increase agricultural productivity. Each agency was evaluated as "developmental" to the extent that it fulfills its mission and, in addition, seeks to improve the quality of its services and extend them to all sectors of the nation.

Factors hypothesized to lead to this outcome can be categorized as those internal to the organization and those affecting it from the outside. The theoretical work of Evans (1979, 1995, 2004) identifies two internal conditions necessary for developmental institutions:

- a) Meritocratic recruitment and promotion
- b) Immunity from bribe-taking, and "capture" by special interests

The recent research literature on actual organizational experiences in Asia and Latin American (Gereffi 1989; Nee 2000; Macleod 2004) identifies a third key internal determinant:

c) Absence of entrenched "islands of power" capable of subverting institutional rules to their own ends.

Recruitment and promotion based on family connections or other personalistic ties are the opposite of condition A. A poorly-paid or otherwise demoralized bureaucracy "for sale" to outside bidders is the alternative to condition B. Powerful managerial cliques and self-seeking union bureaucracies negate condition C. All three internal conditions are related, but they

are not the same: initial meritocratic recruitment and promotions may be subsequently corrupted by outside interests. Entrenched "island of power" may be immune to outside corruption to the extent they manage to channel internal organizational resources for their own ends.

Evans' work can be drawn upon again as the source of the first external determinant:

d) Proactivity, or the ability of the organization to involve itself with clients, users, and other relevant actors in its institutional environment.

Evans (1995) labels this condition "embeddedness". In this study, we use "proactivity", given the prior association of "embeddedness" with the theoretical work of Granovetter (1985) which, as we saw previously, has an important, but altogether different meaning. The final external conditions are derived from the work of John Meyer and his associates (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Meyer and Hannan 1979) on global diffusion of institutional forms and that of Cardoso and Faletto (1979), O'Donnell (1994), Zeitlin (1984), and Portes and Hoffman (2003), on Latin American class structures and their role in perpetuating socio-economic inequality:

- e) Technological flexibility and openness to external innovation
- **f)** Countervailing power, either by the organization itself or its external allies, to prevent control by particularistic interests.

Condition D is negated by inward-looking institutions that seek to protect their own interests and internal cohesiveness, turning a deaf ear to clients, users, and potential opportunities. The opposite of condition E is institutional rigidity, with entrenched traditions – "the way things have always been done" – prevailing over opportunities for innovation.

Reflecting the hierarchies of power portrayed in Figure 1, an institution, no matter how well-designed, that lacks backers and sponsors among top officialdom or among influential elites, is likely to fall prey to entrenched interests or to find a "class wall" frustrating its mission. The experiences of numerous failed agrarian reform programs in developing countries and the well-studied failure of the early Mexican privatization program confronted with unified class resistance provide object lessons on the role of power in subverting the best laid-out institutional plans (MacLeod 2004). Research teams used these six hypotheses as guides to organize their respective studies and, in addition, were asked to rank each individual organization on each predictor. The questionnaire applied in the institutional surveys (Appendix A) includes items measuring the attitudes of the organization's personnel about each of these six criteria. Results from these surveys will be reported below.


Results

Table 2 presents a truth table summarizing organizational rankings in a binary scale, where 1 stands for "presence"; and 0 for absence. These results are analyzable on the basis of Boolean algebra employing Ragin's (1987, 2000) Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The strict binary coding required for Boolean analysis does violence to the nature of most social phenomena that are gradational rather than dichotomous. For this reason, Ragin introduced a second scale based on set theory and ranging from 1 to 5. Scores of 1 in this second scale stand for complete absence of the unit (e.g. in this case institutions) from the theoretic set defined by each determinant or outcome; 5 represents complete membership in this set; and 3 an indeterminate membership in. Figure 2 summarizes the meaning of the scale based on set theory.

Table 2 Crisp-Set Truth Table of Institutional Adequacy and Contribution to National Development in Portugal, 2013

	Internal Determinants			EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS			Оитсомеѕ	
	Α	В	С	D	E	F	1	II
Institution	Meritocracy	Immunity to Corruption	Absence of "Islands of Power"	Proactivity	Technological Openness and Flexibility	External Allies	Institutional Adequacy	Contribution to Development
Energy Company (Energias de Portugal)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Food and Economic Security Authority (ASAE)	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Postal System (CTT – Correios de Portugal)	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
Hospital Santa Maria (HSM – SNS)	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Stock Exchange (NYSE Euronext – Lisbon)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tax Authority (Autoridade Tributária)	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0

Figure 2 The Set-Theoretic Scale



² The final revised score on Contribution to Development provided by the investigator is 3.5 in the continuous scale. For the present analysis, we decided to retain the previous score of 2.5, as it is in greater agreement with the overall evaluation of the institution in the text of the report. This decision does not alter significantly results of the analysis.

Scores in this scale are also analyzable by QCA on the basis of fuzzy-set algebra. Table 3 presents the scores assigned to each organization by the investigators in charge. It should be emphasized that scores in each scale were assigned by researchers individually and independently. They represent, therefore, independent values. Before submitting these data to algebraic manipulation, it is worth reviewing the qualitative evaluations for each of the hypothesized determinants.

Table 3 Fuzzy-Set Truth Table of Institutional Adequacy and Contribution to National Development in Portugal, 2013

	INTERN	al Deter	MINANTS	External Determinants			Оитсомеѕ	
	Α	В	С	D	E	F	I	Ш
Institution	Meritocracy	Immunity to Corruption	Absence of "Islands of Power"	Proactivity	Technological Openness and Flexibility	External Allies	Institutional Adequacy	Contribution to Development
Energy Company (Energias de Portugal)	4.5	4.5	4	5	5	5	5	4.5
Food and Economic Security Authority (ASAE)	1	5	5	5	4	4	5	5
Postal System (CTT – Correios de Portugal)	2	3.5	1	4	4	2	4	5
Hospital Santa Maria (HSM – SNS)	1	2	1	4	3	1	2.5	3
Stock Exchange (NYSE Euronext – Lisbon)	5	5	5	4	5	4	5	3.5
Tax Authority² (Autoridade Tributária)	4.5	4	4	3.5	4.5	3	4	2.5

Problematic Meritocracy

The conceptual definition of meritocracy used for the study is: "Recruitment and promotion based on universal criteria of qualifications and performance without regard for personal ties." A look at the rankings in Tables 2 and 3 indicates that one of the weakest determinants of institutional quality is meritocratic recruitment and promotion. The exceptions are the private entities included in the sample – the energy company and the stock exchange – plus the tax authority³. The other public entities fared much worse for a number of reasons. State austerity – leading to hiring freezes, the suspension of public examinations (concursos) and the slowdown in promotions – is an important factor. It is not, however, the only one because personalistic preferences and connections play an important role in several instances.

The postal system has been directly affected by the freezing of new hiring and promotions, but also by the presence of other factors weakening universalistic criteria within the organization⁴. These include, according to the institutional report, "the color of government", "little favors", "personal and political relations", and "personal sympathy" (Gomes Bezerra 2013). According to a highly critical union informant, "the worker is evaluated according to the relations that he or she has, her or his friends, his or her political party, but not on the basis of professional conduct" (Gomes Bezerra 2013: 30).

Meritocracy in the Food and Economic Security Authority (ASAE) is also weakened by the suspension of hiring and freezes of merit promotions. In addition, according to well-placed informants, one-third of the personnel are "parachutists" (paraquedistas) that did not come from precursor agencies or through examinations (concursos). Worth mentioning as well is that a majority of respondents in the institutional survey (62%) agreed that "Appointments and promotions in ASAE depend essentially on personal relations" and that 39 percent disagreed that "If they follow the rules and do their work competently, people are promoted in ASAE" (Contumélias 2013: 30-31; Institutional Survey).

The most problematic situation is that of the Hospital de Santa Maria where meritocracy is compromised by the combination of career appointments with temporary and part-time contracts; the presence of entrenched influential directors; and the crisscrossing of ideological loyalties associated with political parties, Masonic lodges, and Catholic organizations. For a key informant: "Meritocracy does not really exist because everyone knows beforehand who will be selected" (Pires 2013a: 33).

Even former leaders of the Hospital administration admit that: "Today, there is no evaluative model of the personnel indexed by meritocratic criteria and thus we end up joining in the same sack many good and many bad people." To top it all, departmental directors are never fired and, although

^{3.} It should be mentioned, however, that the high rankings (1 and 4.5) assigned to EDP in Meritocracy are supported by a majority, but not a totality of respondents in the respective institutional survey. About one-third of EDP functionaries agreed that "Promotions in EDP depend essentially on personal relations" and a similar figure disagreed that "If they follow the rules and do their work competently, people will be promoted within EDP" (institutional survey).

⁴⁻The study was conducted before the privatization of CTT, late in 2013.

appointed for three years, remain forever "leaving only when they reach age 70." (Pires 2013b: 30-31).

In contrast to the other public services, the Tax Authority is evaluated as being meritocratic. Outside informants agree that tax inspectors receive intense professional training and the number of functionaries with a university degree grew rapidly after 1970. Informants recognize, however, that there is inter-generational recruitment, with entire families employed by the agency. This pattern appears to reflect better information about employment opportunities transmitted by family members rather than direct violation of meritocratic criteria in hiring and promotion (Evans 2013).

Immunity to Corruption

The second internal determinant of institutional adequacy and contribution to development was conceptually defined as follows:

- 1) Low or no probability of buying the actions and decisions of officials.
- **2)** Low or no probability that personal or family ties influence decisions or appointments.

The first criterion is an indicator of the absence of *major* instances of organizational corruption; the second refers to the absence of a patrimonial, personalistic orientation that subverts universalistic criteria. Major instances of corruption were not found in any of the institutions included in the sample. Bribing officials to obtain jobs or privileges seems to have been effectively stamped out from major Portuguese institutions. Personalism and patrimonialism are another matter. As before, the private organizations fare better on this score. The Stock Exchange, in particular, is governed by all the rules and regulations of firms quoted in the New York Exchange, having to follow all the criteria of information accessibility, transparency, and ethics common to such firms. In the words of one of its leaders, "This would be the last entity to run the risk of being caught in an inconvenient, much less unethical situation" (Pompeia, 2013b: 22).

Similarly, the energy company, EDP, has demonstrated a profound concern with ethical questions and the prevention of any semblance of corruption. In 2005, it promulgated its Code of Ethics, followed by an operational system of entrepreneurial ethics. It trains its executives and subordinate personnel on these matters and it has received external recognition for such efforts. EDP was one of three Portuguese enterprises mentioned in the publication "The World's Most Ethical (WME) Companies", where it was listed as one of the 145 most ethical firms in the world (Vaz da Silva 2013: 48).

In partial support of this external assessment, only 3 percent of respondents in the institutional survey disagreed with the statement: "Most leaders and administrators of EDP are honest and competent individuals" and no one disagreed that "The majority of EDP personnel is immune to corruption" (a statement supported by 73%) (Vaz da Silva 2013: 48-49; Institutional Survey).

Of the public institutions, ASAE comes out best. The perfect score received by the organization is due to the major efforts of its leadership to prevent and, when necessary, punish corrupt acts by its inspectors. ASAE is a young agency and, until 2013, was led by the same inspector-general, a charismatic figure to which much of its effectiveness and probity seem to be due. Accordingly, not one informant, internal or external to the organization, reported a single case of corruption. Thus, even if meritocracy is lacking, "in its seven years of life, not a single process for corruption was opened against its personnel". According to the national director of operations, "I don't know of any case of corruption; this is the consequence of setting up mechanisms to prevent it from the beginnings of the agency in 2006" (Contumélias 2013: 31). Accordingly, only 2 percent of respondents in the institutional survey disagreed with the statement: "Most of ASAE's personnel are immune to corruption" (Institutional Survey).

The introduction of computer technology has eliminated the room for exchange of favors by tax inspectors and section leaders of the Tax Authority, but the institutional report is emphatic about the gap between the tight controls to which small contributors are subjected and the much more lenient treatment received by large corporation and economic elites:

The development of the fiscal consulting industry during the last decade has led to the adoption of sophisticated planning (and tax evasion) mechanisms by the financial sector and economic conglomerates. This implementation of tax evasion is achieved through off-shore investments and complemented by access to the executive that permits the introduction of subtle "budgetary Trojan horses" (Evans 2013: 11).

While not representing evidence of rampant corruption inside the Tax authority, marked differences in the treatment of tax payers situated at different levels of the socio-economic hierarchy bears on the overall assessment of institutional adequacy and contribution to development, as seen below.

The situation in the remaining services is weaker, especially in the Hospital de Santa Maria. According to the report, ten years ago the situation was out of control with no records of utilization of equipment and regular

thefts by physicians and other personnel appropriating whatever they wanted from the hospital's warehouses to supply their private clinics. Conditions deteriorated to the point that there was a move afoot to close the hospital. Only the energetic intervention of the Health Minister, appointing a new Administrative Council (CA) and an effective and charismatic new president saved the institution. The level of corruption was such that this president and his family suffered repeated death threats and had to be accompanied by bodyguards for some time (Pires 2014).

Today, conditions are better and major instances of corruption represent a thing of the past. However, minor ones – such as exchanges of favors, moving friends and relatives ahead in the queue for major operations, and sending patients for analyses to private laboratories of which the referring physician is an owner – are still common. According to the report, "small-scale corruption permeates the entire institution" (Pires 2013b: 44). This is largely due to the crisscrossing of private and public interests within the hospital and the presence of outside political and even religious factions. According to another informant, "corruption declined in the HSM starting in 2005; in some areas, yes, but others I don't know. No one knows what is happening inside there. Too many heavy-weights playing in the same house; barons of this and of that" (Pires 2013b: 44)

Islands of Power

The final internal determinant is the absence of "islands of power", conceptually defined as "no evidence of informal cliques of officials, managers, or union officials dedicated to channeling resources of the organization to their own advantage".

The profile offered by institutions in this case is very similar to that just described. Again, the stock exchange and the energy company escape this problem for the same reasons seen previously. It should be noted, however, that the high score given by the investigator in charge of the EDP in this dimension is partially contested by the 16 percent of survey respondents agreeing with the statement: "There are groups within EDP that act according to their own interests, even if they harm the broader interests of the organization." The remaining 84 percent neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement (Institutional Survey).

The relative small size of the ASAE and the effective control, until recently, by its leadership prevented, according to the investigator in charge, the emergence of cliques subverting its mission. Nevertheless, 32 percent of survey respondents agreed that such groups existed within the organization

and only 17 percent disagreed. The investigator countered these opinions by affirming that "if such groups exist within the ASAE, they are not visible as a force capable of influencing essential decisions or collective action... the hierarchy is vertical and accompanies permanently all the activities of the organization" (Contumélias 2013: 33; Institutional Survey).

The institutional weaknesses in the Hospital de Santa Maria, described previously, are closely connected with the presence of numerous interest groups and cliques both inside and outside of the institution. A similar situation is apparent in CTT Correios. According to several informants, islands of power have a name within the postal system, they are known as "quintas", analogous to inherited lands. According to one informant:

Each "quinta" has its little territory. This here is like an archipelago. There are too many of these islands – those of the chiefs, the sub-chiefs, the adjuncts to the sub-chiefs" (Gomes Bezerra 2013: 33).

The investigator in charge even provides a diagram describing all the "islands" influencing decisions and activities within the postal system. Most of them affect the CTT negatively, either by preventing necessary changes or by precipitating actions benefiting of specific groups. Particularly harmful are islands linked to political parties and the "quintas" created by former executives who never leave the organization. They also have a name within the CTT, postalistas:

They change chairs, but they are always the same... and they only leave when they reach the age limit (Gomes Bezerra 2013: 34).

In the Hospital de Santa Maria and, by extension, the National Health Service and in the postal system practices linked to a patrimonial, pre-modern form of bureaucratic organization are, hence, far from eradicated. Progress is evident in the elimination of major forms of corruption, but neither meritocracy nor impartial and universal modes of operation are yet dominant. The proliferation of little "territories" carved out of the organization by diverse interest groups stands out as the most damaging feature for these institutions and one of those in greater need of future reform.

The situation in the Tax Authority does not appear to be much better. In the words of the investigator in charge: "A closed and hierarchical organization crisscrossed by horizontal structures dispersed geographically, and centralized services isolated from their base is a propitious environment for the proliferation of islands of power" (Evans 2013: 7).

Remarkable Proactivity

Proactivity is conceptually defined as: "Substantial evidence of activities and campaigns by the organization aimed at improving its services and obtaining the cooperation of the relevant public". One of the more interesting results of this study is that, regardless of their internal strengths or failings, all or most organizations meet this criterion of institutional quality. Such behavior could be expected of the private entities, whose internal organization and ethical standards appear unimpeachable. Indeed, the stock exchange has gone beyond the call of duty to advertise itself to prospective clients. These activities include a "Listing Team" dedicated exclusively to prospect for new clients by divulging the advantages of being listed in the Exchange; the "IPO Week-end", an annual retreat to which 30 or so CEOs and CFOs of important companies are invited to inform them of the Bolsa's operations, programs, and advantages; and the "Global Investment Challenge", a simulation open to the public, especially youths, who can realistically practice investments and trade. The last such exercise attracted between seven and ten thousand persons and was co-sponsored by the journal Expresso (Pompeia 2013a: 19; 2013b: 24).

However, even the organizations most affected by the internal problems discussed previously appear capable of acting effectively toward their users and other relevant publics. The postal system and the health system deserve special mention in this regard. CTT Correios possesses a permanent evaluation panel and carries out multiple programs of interaction with its clients. This active concern is justified by the fact that the sole income of the organization comes from its sales. As an outside informant reported:

One of the variables for our evaluation is the opinion that our interlocutors have of us. That evaluation is always very good. That is, all our clients perceive the positive ways in which CTT has evolved in the last years, both in technological terms and in terms of relations with the public which have ceased to be bureaucratic to become more personal (Gomes Bezerra 2013: 41).

Postal union leaders interviewed in the course of the study agree that CTT has become very proactive toward its users and increasingly innovative, but argue that it could do even more. On the other hand, and according to a study carried out by Reader's Digest (Selecções) evaluating public attitudes toward firms in forty different areas, the public enterprise in which the Portuguese place greatest trust is actually the CTT (Gomes Bezerra 2013: 42).

The Santa Maria Hospital, on its part, is one of the few national hospitals that possess a Patient's Bureau and a Social Action Service staffed by

more than 50 social workers, distributed around all medical departments and focused on the most serious social cases. The Patient's Bureau has been re-organized to receive patients' claims, complaints, and suggestions and to disseminate information through all units – from the emergency room to the daily clinics. In addition, a survey of patients' satisfaction and complaints is conducted regularly by the Emergency Service (which registers the largest number of patients' claims) (Pires 2013b: 49-50).

The annual accounting report of HSM for 2011 summarizes the gains produced by the Patients Bureau and the Social Action Service:

Consolidation of information coverage; decline in situations of non-coincidence between medical and social release of patients; reinforcement of social interventions in the walk-in clinics; decline of cases of family abandonment or rejection (Pires 2013b: 49).

The overall level of proactivity of the Santa Maria depends on the orientations of the directors of the various departments but, in general, the investigator found that they all acted, with greater or lesser energy, to transmit relevant information to patients and respond to their claims. The overall profile of Portuguese institutions on this criterion is, therefore, consistently positive. Even organizations rife by the absence of meritocratic recruitment and promotion, multiple instances of traffic of influence, and personalistic ties are capable to deliver effective services to their clients and to initiate and maintain active ties with them.

The hierarchical and secretive Tax authority does its bit of proactivity by training outside professionals – Tax Technicians (TOCs) and Tax Reviewers (ROCs) – in the relevant rules. However, proactivity toward the citizenry itself, as in efforts to educate the public on its civic tax-paying obligations and efforts to reduce inequalities between privileged elites and the general public appear to be largely absent. The lower score received by the agency on this dimension reflects its lack of engagement with its natural clientele – the tax-paying public.

An "Open Technology" Nation

The fifth hypothesized determinant, Technological Opening and Flexibility, is defined as: 1) Substantial evidence of application of modern telecommunications and other technologies; 2) Evidence of active efforts by managers aimed at incorporating new and better practices over traditional ones. The available evidence indicates that, as in the case of Proactivity, this is one of the strengths

of all Portuguese institutions. The institutional reports provide one illustration after another of this pattern in every sector. The EDP is truly a leader in this area, dividing its resources in five specific areas – from energetic efficiency to renewable energy sources. It has invested heavily in a project, "Smart Grids", to facilitate energy transmission from producers, large and small, using diverse sources of energy. Through the project InovGrid, EDP put itself at the lead in Europe in this type of technology. Results of the institutional survey are emphatic in confirming the organization's strength in this area: 98 percent of respondents agreed that 'EDP seeks to be up-to-date with respect to the use of new technologies and procedures"; and 93 percent endorsed the statement: "This organization seeks to change things, introducing better technologies any time it can" (Vaz da Silva 2013: 57-61; Institutional Survey).

The NYSE Euronext Lisbon is on a similar plane. It develops its own technological solutions that it sells afterwards to other firms. Such products, in the form of information services, data services, and market research generate 15 percent of the agency's receipts (Pompeia 2013b: 28). Among public agencies, the Tax Authority appears to be the strongest and most systematic innovator. It must be in order to fulfill its mission. Sustained technological innovations took place during the entire period since the restoration of democracy in Portugal, but the grand leap forward took place after Portugal joined the European Community and introduced the value-added tax. This led to the emergence of a completely re-designed and centralized structure, including a new computational center for the IVA (Evans 2014). The other public agencies are similarly oriented, although technological innovation in them is hampered by the increasing scarcity of resources. In the case of ASAE, the important outcome is significant progress since the time of its creation. As a key informant familiar with that period reported:

When we arrived here, no one had e-mail, no one had Internet, many functionaries did not know even how to open a computer, so we started a training center teaching personnel how to use the equipment. Today, all inspectors have laptops, cell phones and GPS-equipped radios and they know how to use them (Contumélias 2013: 35).

Further, the ASAE possesses its own internal digitalized information system the "GESTASAE" and supports a Website easily accessible to all firms, operators, and consumers. The site registered over 300,000 visits in 2012. Agency personnel generally perceive it in a positive light in this dimension of institutional quality, as evidenced by the 72 percent who agreed with the statement:

"ASAE seeks to be up-to-date with respect to the use of new technologies and innovative procedures" (Contumélias 2013: 36; institutional survey).

The lowest scores were assigned to the Hospital de Santa Maria, but even it was sufficiently innovative to receive a score of 1 in the crisp-set scale (Table 2). The problem in this case is what the institutional report labels "brutal" budgetary cuts that have slowed down the pace of technological innovation and prevented the institution from doing more. But as one of the major hospitals of the nation, the Santa Maria continues to be a model of technological prowess. The institutional accounts for 2009-11, right in the midst of the economic crisis, lists investments of 27,2 million euros in building construction; 29 million in medical equipment, and 9 million in computer software and hardware. During this time, the HSM was able to purchase two linear accelerators for the Radiotherapy Department and introduced a number of improvements in its departments of Clinical Pathology and Emergency Services (Pires 2013b: 53). Although, according to hospital quality engineers, the Santa Maria is in need of many more technological innovations, there is no question of a collective will by its leadership to maintain the gains of the past and, within the present somber financial situation, advance further in selected areas (Pires 2014).

External Allies and "Orphan" Institutions

External allies, the last criterion of institutional quality, are defined as: "The extent to which the agency counts with the active support of top echelons of government or corporate elites". The opposite condition is that of "orphan" institutions that are often at the mercy of powerful interests seeking to subvert their mission (MacLeod 2004; Portes and Smith 2012: Ch. 8). In this criterion, we find significant variation among the institutions studied. Again, the two private organizations appear to be the best protected, both by their domestic relationships and their international connections. In the case of the Stock Exchange, its membership in Euronext and the New York Exchange endows it with powerful external sponsors capable of trumping any particularistic interests. In addition, it is regulated and monitored by strong domestic entities, such as the Bank of Portugal, the Insurance Institute of Portugal, and the National Commission of Stock Values (CMVM). All these entities are charged with insuring the transparency, universalism, and impartiality of market transactions and in preventing even minimum deviations in favor of special interests (Pompeia 2013b: 12-16).

In the case of EDP, it is defended by its foreign stock owners and by its very size. It is much more likely that EDP influences decisions of state

agencies and private corporations than vice versa. Given its corporate ownership, diversification, and sheer size, this is an instance of an organization that does not require too many external allies. As an example, the EDP Foundation is today the largest corporate foundation in Portugal, with vast influence among the public and in the state. All the resources of the Foundation, with an annual budget of 14 million euros, come from the parent corporation (Vaz da Silva 2013: 62-63).

Studies of the tax authorities of the five Latin American countries included in the prior study discussed previously, consistently found strong support for its mission at the highest levels of government (Portes and Smith 2012: Ch. 8). One may surmise that the same would be the case in Portugal. Yet, the institutional report speaks of internal conflicts between the various tax directorates prior to their fusion in 2011 and the creation of obstacles by the agency's natural ally – the Ministry of Finance – through tight budgets and shifting regulations. Nevertheless, the middling fuzzy-set scores received by the agency in this dimension still reflect its essential mission for the state and, hence, the imperative by top echelons of government to support it in some form.

The other three public agencies face a parallel situation. The high scores given to the ASAE on external allies are based more on its past record, than on its probable future, as the institutional report makes clear. It is true that the agency is endowed with its own juridical personality and administrative autonomy, being defined as a central entity in the state administration. It is also true that, by virtue of its membership in the European Food Safety Authority, it can count on the endorsement of influential international allies (Contumélias 2013: 39). In the past, decisive support for ASAE when confronted with opposition against its policing actions came from the Ministry of the Economy.

The report cites a number of critics who viewed ASAE's monitoring and sanctioning of the food and hospitality industries as excessive, but these critiques did not affect the agency's leadership or the support of its external allies. Recent changes, however, associated with the retirement of its chief since the agency's creation (Inspector General Antonio Nunes); the successive budgetary cuts; and, most importantly, the transfer of the agency from the Ministry of Economy to the Secretariat of Tourism do not bode well for its independence or its capacity to sustain a strong regulatory presence in the future. Unsurprisingly, only 23 percent of respondents in the institutional survey agreed that "There is good cooperation between ASAE and top decision makers of the Portuguese public administration" (Contumélias 2013: 40, 42; Institutional Survey).

The worst situations are found in the other two public services. The "natural" allies of the Hospital de Santa Maria are the Health Ministry and the

Ministry of Finance (Pires 2013b: 56), but, during the last few years and in a context of serious economic crisis, the relationship became adversarial and the allies turned into opponents. Negotiations became ever more difficult as the Hospital suffered successive budget cuts amounting to tens of millions of euros. Neither the population served by the Hospital nor the School of Medicine or the professional medical associations have come to the rescue so far, leaving the hospital's Administrative Council to confront the crisis alone (Pires 2014). The Santa Maria is, for all practical purposes, an orphan institution.

Perhaps the best proof of the lack of external allies of the postal system is its recent privatization. Unlike postal systems elsewhere, the CTT Group is actually profitable although, in a context of economic crisis, the state prevented it from using part of these profits to reward merit or provide other incentives to its personnel. Instead, the last Administrative Council was appointed with the explicit mission of privatizing the enterprise. While the expectation is that multiple benefits will flow from privatization, reality may be different. As a union leader put it:

Privatization is not a good road. None of the other postal privatizations carried out in Europe have given satisfactory results, either in the quality of services or the conditions of work for the personnel (Gomes Bezerra 2013: 44-45).

The postal systems of Argentina and Chile, studied as part of the comparative study of Latin American institutions described previously, support this evaluation. Attempts at privatization in both countries yielded such poor results, that they had to be brought back under state control. In large part, this was due to the inevitable tendency among private postal operators to appropriate the most profitable segments of the market in large cities, abandoning the rest of the country and especially isolated rural areas to their fate (Grimson *et al.* 2012; Cereceda 2009; Portes and Smith 2012: Ch. 8). It remains to be seen if the same course is followed by the privatized CTT in Portugal.

Outcomes: the Quality of Institutions

Two outcomes were evaluated by each individual study: A) Institutional Adequacy, conceptually defined as the correspondence of the real organization with the blueprints and goals for which it was created. As highlighted in Figure 1, institutional blueprints do not always correspond to actual practice and evaluating this relation was one of the principal goals of the study. B) Contribution to Development, defined as the extent to which the real organization supports and advances national economic, social, and/or political progress in its own sphere of activity.

The two outcomes overlap, but they are not the same. It is possible for an agency to fulfill its criteria of institutional adequacy without playing a significant role in any developmental sphere. Such situation may be due to the intrinsic lack of importance of an agency's mission, the "scooping" of that mission by other more efficient actors, or the resistance of relevant publics to collaborate and support its efforts. This lack of overlap is evident in the first truth table (Table 2) in the case of the Tax Authority and, in the second (Table 3), in that of the Stock Exchange.

The Tax Authority evidently fulfills its institutional mandate of generating revenue for the state. Sustained technological progress has made it ever more efficient in this mission. Judged solely by its capacity to extract resources from the general population, the agency must be evaluated as institutionally adequate. However, the fiscal pressure that it can bring to bear on taxpayers is applied very unequally to those situated at different levels of the Portuguese class system:

There is an obvious disequilibrium between the rigid tax compliance imposed on salaried employees and the proliferation of sophisticated instruments of tax evasion by large contributors in the financial sector and large conglomerates... The problem is not the size of the tax gap, but its distribution among sectors of the population (Evans 2013: 9).

To this must be added the strongly centralized, hierarchical, and distant character of the agency that does little to generate a receptive attitude

among the general public or to contribute to national development beyond the narrow quantitative criterion of higher tax receipts. Further, there is no evidence that the Portuguese tax authority has attempted to couple the threat of sanctions to insure compliance with any effort to educate the general public on tax-paying as a civic duty. This effort has already been implemented in several Latin American countries (Evans 2014; Wormald and Cardenas 2008).

The NYSE Euronext Lisbon is a "perfect" institution in terms of fulfilling all criteria of institutional adequacy, yet it received a mediocre score in its contribution to development. This is due to the failure of the Exchange to persuade companies to list themselves and the Portuguese state to make more effective use of credit instruments transacted in the Exchange for its financial needs. As the investigator in charge poignantly concludes:

We cannot forget the presence of the "elephant in the room". From a universe of 300,000 Portuguese companies only 53 are listed in the Exchange. On average, the Exchange contributes less than 1 percent to the financing of national enterprises (Pompeia 2013b: 26).

The perfect scores of EDP at both Institutional Adequacy and Contribution to Development flow naturally from the high scores of the organization in all six determinants. The high scores of the other three public agencies, especially in the crisp-set truth table, reflect more their past than their probable future. The institutional report on the ASAE concludes, for example, that:

The Food and Economic Security Authority fulfills the objectives for which it was created and has provided a positive contribution to national development, as shown by results of its activities and positive evaluation both by consumers and representative organizations in its sphere of activity (Contumélias 2013: 44).

Yet a few lines before, the same report notes the growing fears that ASAE would become more a "preventive" (i.e. advising) entity than the solid inspecting and regulatory agency that is has been in the past. In the case of the postal system, a high score in both institutional outcomes is based on its effective coverage of 100 percent of the national territory, the quality and diversity of its services, and its profitability. Yet, as noted above, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the future as the agency is transferred to private hands.

In the case of the Santa Maria Hospital, a positive evaluation of its institutional adequacy is weakened by the long waiting periods both for medical

appointments and programmed surgeries. Patients' complaints and numerous press articles about the topic weaken the legitimacy of the Hospital $vis-\dot{a}-vis$ the public. This deficit and the numerous other problems seen previously are likely to get worse in a context of severe budgetary constraints. Despite all of this, the organization received positive scores in its contribution to development. The investigator in charge justified this evaluation as follows:

We believe that this outcome should be evaluated positively, taking into account the intrinsic character of the institution and its national-level role. If we focus on the nation as a whole, this positive evaluation is reinforced by a comparative perspective⁵ (Pires 2013b: 69).

^{5.} Presumably in comparison with other hospitals within the SNS.

Chapter 8

Boolean Analysis

This section presents results of the analysis of crisp-set scores in Table 2. The rows in Table 2 represent logical combinations of the six determinants and two outcomes. There are 2^k such logical combinations where k represents the number of determinants. The absent 58 combinations are known as "remainders" and can be used for various purposes in the analysis. The most conservative solution is to assume that, had these combinations appeared in the data, they would *not* have produced either effect (Ragin 2008: 131; 1987: Ch. 6). This allows us to focus on the existing combinations.

In Boolean analysis the absence of a cause has the same logical status as its presence. "Absence" is denoted by lower capital letters. The first step of the analysis consists in listing all the causal expressions that produce the outcome of interest. In Boolean algebra, the operator "+" stands for logical "or" and the operator "()" for logical "and". A look at Table 2 shows that all existing combinations lead to Institutional Adequacy and all but one to Contribution to Development. The resulting equations are as follows:

Institutional Adequacy = ABCDEF + aBCDEF + aBcDEf + abcDEf + ABcdEF Contribution to Development = ABCDEF + aBCDEF + aBcDEf + abcDEf

Letters stand for presence or absence of a determinant and identical logical combinations are not repeated. Terms in equations I and II are known as "primitives". Their simplification to a final solution is based on the logical principle that if a determinant is simultaneously present and absent in two of these causal expressions, it is irrelevant in producing the final outcome. Thus, expressions ABCDEF and aBCDEF in the above equations simplify to BCDEF. Based on this principle and proceeding one step at a time, we arrive at the final solutions. Knowing this minimization principle and based on the few combinations in each table, the solution can be arrived at by visual inspection:

Institutional Adequacy = E
Contribution to Development = DE

This implies that Technological Flexibility is sufficient and necessary to produce institutionally adequate institutions and that, in combination with Proactivity, it leads to effective developmental ones. This result is subject to two observations. The first is that it is preliminary and subject to modification on the basis of the more complex analysis of fuzzy set scores, presented below. The second is the apparent lack of causal weight of the internal determinants of institutional quality that fail to appear in either solution. Based on them, it would seem that Portuguese institutions can push national development forward even if they lack meritocracy and are riddled with "quintas" and other personalistic ties. All that is needed, apparently, is openness to the outside, both in terms of being receptive to external innovations and engaging with relevant publics in their respective spheres of activity.

There are interesting similarities and differences with results arrived at by the crisp-set analysis of the 23 Latin American institutions included in the study described previously. Results were:

```
Institutional Adequacy = ABCE
Contribution to Development = D (A + C) (Portes and Smith 2012: 170-71).
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In this case, internal determinants, reflecting a "Weberian-like" institution, played a far more significant role (Evans 1995, 2004). However, E (Technological Flexibility) is part of the solution for the first outcome and D (Proactivity) is the necessary condition for the second. These similarities support the importance of both external criteria of institutional quality as they operate in different historical and economic contexts.

The simple solutions arrived at by Boolean algebra in the Portuguese case are a direct function of the greater tolerance by the investigators to internal failings of the institutions studied, relative to the earlier Latin American results. This stance will be discussed at greater length below. Its direct effect in this analysis is to make all or practically all combinations of causal determinants lead to the same effect. Boolean minimization does the rest by identifying as causally relevant only those factors present in all existing combinations.

Chapter 8

Fuzzy-set Analysis

The analysis of binary rankings in the preceding section identified the combination of Proactivity toward the external environment and Technological Flexibility as the sufficient and necessary conditions to build up a developmental institution. Reality can be more complicated than this and, for that reason, we now focus on the analysis of fuzzy-set scores presented in Table 3. As seen in Figure 2, the metric of these scores ranges from 1 for "completely outside" the set defined by the relevant theoretical dimension to 5 for "completely inside." The rankings thus produced can be analyzed on the basis of fuzzy-set algebra (Ragin 2008, Vaisey 2009).

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) allows us to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for each effect of interest. Necessary conditions must be present for the outcome to be present, but they do not guarantee this result. Fuzzy-sets translate this definition into the expectation that scores in the determinant must be equal or higher than in the outcome. Intuitively, membership in the set defined by the effect in a subset of that defined by membership in the cause. Necessary conditions thus create a "ceiling" for the expected effect (Ragin 2000: Ch. 8).

Sufficient conditions always lead to the effect, but the latter may also occur in their absence due to other causes. The logical translation in fuzzy-sets algebra is that scores in the set defined by the cause be equal or lower than scores in the outcome. In effect, sufficient conditions create a "floor" for the outcome by assuming that membership in that set is a superset of that defined by the cause. The logic of necessary and sufficient conditions is summarized in Table 4.

Table 4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Fuzzy-set Algebra

		Requirement		
		Cause \geq Effect	Effect ≥ Cause	
	Necessary	X	0	
Determinant				
	Sufficient	0	Х	

6. This was the methodology used in the prior published study of Latin American institutions. See Portes and Smith, 2009; 2012.

Prior analyses based on QCA methodology proceeded to count the number of times each cause fulfilled the requirement for necessity or sufficiency dividing it by the total number of such paired scores. The resulting percentage was then assumed to be an indicator of "consistency" – the number of times a hypothesized cause actually predicts the outcome of interest (Ragin 2000).⁶ This method is limited because it gives equal weight to small deviations from the predicted outcome and to large ones. For example, if scores in a predicted sufficient condition A was 4.5 and scores in the outcome X was 4.0, this small deviation (0.5) counted the same as if the score in the outcome had been 2, representing a much higher error.

To remedy the problem, Ragin (2008) introduced formulas for sufficiency and necessity that differentially penalize large vs. small errors from the predicted results. For sufficiency the formula is:

$$(X < Y) = \sum_{j \in X} \min(X_j) (Y_j) / \sum_{j \in X_j} X_j$$

Where: X is the cause; Y is the effect; $\sum j \min (Xj) (Yj)$ is the sum of the lower scores in X or Y over j cases; and $\sum Xj$ is the sum of scores in the cause. The formula for necessity just inverts terms

$$(Y < X) = \sum_{j \in X} \min(X_j) (Y_j) / \sum_{j \in X_j} Y_j$$

This formula yields consistency scores where large deviations are severely penalized, but small ones are not.

A second criterion to assess the importance of a determinant is coverage. It is possible for a predictor to be perfectly consistent in producing an outcome, but to cover only a small subset of cases. On the other hand, an imperfectly consistent predictor may be more substantively important because it covers a larger proportion of the set defined by the outcome. Figure 3 clarifies the relationship between consistency and coverage for both necessary and sufficient conditions.

Figure 3 Set-theoretic Consistency and Coverage


I. Sufficient Conditions

II. Necessary Conditions


(X = cause; Y = effect)


A. Hight consistency; low coverage¹





B. Low consistency; hight coverage¹





C. Hight consistency; hight coverage¹





1 Shaded area = X correctly predicts Y

Table 5 presents results of the analysis for necessary conditions for the two effects of interest. Institutional Adequacy (IA) is accounted for by three determinants: E (Technological Flexibility) that correctly predicts 96 percent of the cases; B (Immunity to Corruption) and D (Proactivity), each with .94 consistencies. Joining the three predictors yields a consistency score equal to that of the two lower predictors with an equal level of coverage (.94). This formula is more complex than that produced by Boolean analysis, incorporating at least one internal predictor. It says that, for an organization to fulfill its institutional blueprints, it must be resistant to corruption, in addition to being technologically flexible and proactive:

IA = BDE

^{7.} In fuzzy-set algebra, the consistency of complex causal terms joined by the logical operator "and" is equal to the lower consistency score among the individual components. Coverage of necessary conditions turns out to be equal to the formula for the corresponding sufficient conditions. See Ragin 2008;

Table 5 Portuguese Institutional Project Analysis of Fuzzy Set Scores (I)

	Necessary Conditions					
	$(Y \leq X) = \Sigma \min(X_i) (Y_i) / \Sigma Y_i$					
	Institutional Adequacy	Contributions to Development				
A. Meritocracy	17.5/25.5 = .682	14.5/23.5 = .617				
B. Immunity to Corruption	24/25.5 = .941	20.5/23.5 = .872				
C. No "Islands of Power"	20/25.5 = .784	16.5/23.5 = .702				
D. Proactivity	24.0/25.5 = .941	22.5/23.5 = .957				
E. Technological Flexibility	24.5/25.5 = .961	21.5/23.5 = .915				
F. External Allies	19.0/25.5 = .745	17.5/23.5 = .745				
	Consistency	Coverage ¹				
Institutional Adequacy =	B + D + E	B D E				
	.941 .941 .961	1.00 .941 .961				
BDE	.941	.941				
Contribution to Development =	<u>D</u> + <u>E</u>	<u>D</u> <u>E</u>				
	.957 .915	0.882 .843				
DE	.915	.843				

¹⁾ The formula for coverage is provided by Ragin (2008).

Necessary conditions for Contributions to Development (CD) drop the internal predictor, B, to keep only the two external ones. Both, Proactivity and Technological Flexibility correctly predict over 90 percent of the time, although their level of coverage drops somewhat to the high 80s. Nevertheless, they remain the only two significant predictors, yielding a formula identical to that identified by Boolean algebra:

CD = DE

The analysis of sufficient conditions yields somewhat different and theoretically significant results. Relevant figures are presented in Table 6. Institutional Adequacy is determined by B (Immunity to Corruption), C (No "Islands of Power") and F (External Allies), all with perfect consistency. However, coverage of the last two determinants drops to the 70s, meaning that, while they always predict the effect accurately, they only cover a limited number of cases. For this reason, we settle on the first predictor as causally sufficient:

IA = B

It is actually identical to the formula for sufficiency, once necessary conditions have been identified.

Table 6 Portuguese Institutional Project Analysis of Fuzzy Set Scores (II)

	Sufficient Conditions $(X \le Y) = \sum \min(X_i) (Y_i) / \sum X_i$			
	Institutional Adequacy	Contributions to Development		
A. Meritocracy	17.5/18 = .972	14.5/18 = .806		
B. Immunity to Corruption	24.0/24.0 = 1.00	20.5/24 = .854		
C. No "Islands of Power"	20.0/20.0 = 1.00	16.5/20 = .825		
D. Proactivity	24.0/25.5 = .941	22.5/25.5 = .882		
E. Technological Flexibility	24.5/25.5 = .961	21.5/25.5 = .843		
F. External Allies	19.0/19.0 = 1.00	17.5/19.0 = .921		
	Consistency	Coverage ¹		
Institutional Adequacy =	<u>B</u> + <u>C</u> + <u>F</u>	<u>B</u> <u>C</u> <u>F</u>		
	1.00 1.00 1.00	.941 .784 .745		
		.745		
Contribution to Development =	D + <u>E</u>	D <u>E</u>		
	.882 .921	.957 .745		

¹⁾ The formula for coverage is provided by Ragin (2008).

This implies that, by itself, Immunity to Corruption suffices to fulfill an organization's institutional blueprint, although other causal combinations (presumably associated with the other consistent predictors, C and F, can also bring about this effect in certain situations). The prior analysis of necessary conditions indicates that B cannot produce its effect in the absence of Proactivity and Technological Flexibility so that the final causal formula for this outcome becomes the same as that arrived at previously:

IA = BDE

The analysis of sufficiency for Contribution to Development yields a single determinant exceeding .90 consistency: External Allies (F). However, another one comes close and it is the same as repeatedly noted earlier: Proactivity (D). F always leads to a developmental institution, but it covers only a limited number of cases⁸. This situation produces two possible solutions:

CD = F (higher consistency; lower coverage)

or

CD = D (lower consistency; higher coverage)

8. The high consistency of F as a sufficient condition for a developmental institution is due to the low scores assigned in this dimension for several cases, which allows it to meet the criteria for sufficiency. By the same token, F is far from necessary, as shown in Table 5. This returns us to D as the pivotal causal dimension.

It is actually identical to the formula for necessity once sufficient conditions have been identified.

Bringing in necessary conditions identified previously, we arrive at the following final solutions:

CD = DE or CD = DEF

The first indicates that the combination of Proactivity and Technological Flexibility is both necessary and sufficient to create a developmental institution in almost every instance; the second shows that the addition of External Allies makes this outcome even more certain. In either case, the pivotal role corresponds to DE indicating that, while Immunity to Corruption (B) is a necessary condition for institutionally adequate organizations, none of the internal criteria of "Weberianness" is necessary or sufficient to bring about a developmental one. This set of analytical results gives rise to several reflections.

First, the solution for Institutional Adequacy differs from that arrived at by the previous study of twenty-three institutions in five Latin American countries: ABCE (Portes and Smith 2012: p.174). In that case, all internal criteria of probity were required to bring about the effect. In the Portuguese case, however, low scores on Meritocracy (A) assigned to most public institutions and, secondarily, similar low scores on the absence of internal "Islands of Power" (C) were no obstacle for the identification of most of the studied organizations as fulfilling their institutional blueprints. Hence, the omission of A and C from the causal formula.

The identification of D as sufficient and of DE as the necessary and sufficient combination for the emergence of a developmental institution represents an independent confirmation of results obtained by the prior Latin American study. In that case, the final solution was:

$$CD = D(A+C)$$

The solution identified Proactivity as the necessary condition for the outcome and as a sufficient cause when combined with one or another indicator of internal organizational quality. In the Portuguese case, the role of Proactivity is even more dramatic since, as seen above, it is identified as the sole sufficient condition for producing this outcome.

A second reflection is that this set of results are in line with Evans' theoretical argument according to which, it does not suffice for an institution to be "Weberian" (i.e. meritocratic, immune to corruption, etc.) in order to foster national development. It must open itself to its environment and

engage with strategic external actors in order to both initiate and regulate processes of economic expansion and improve the quality of governance (Evans 1995; Portes and Smith 2012: Ch. 8).

A third reflection is that, in Portugal, the crucial significance assigned to Proactivity times Technological Flexibility by the six institutional studies is the result of two factors. First, the relative high tolerance to the obvious defects and shortcomings identified in the internal operations of several of these organizations. In the case of the Hospital Santa Maria, for example, very low scores were given to the organization in the internal criteria of meritocracy, immunity to corruption, and absence of "islands of power", but still it was defined as a developmental institution. The same is the case for the postal system. In the case of the Food and Economic Security Authority (ASAE), total absence of meritocracy was no obstacle for ranking it at the top of the contribution-to-development scale. Seemingly, the Portuguese cultural stance toward issues such as lack of meritocracy or the presence of inner cliques in public institutions is more relaxed than that encountered elsewhere.

A second reason for the key role assigned to Proactivity in this analysis has to do with the evaluations on this dimension of two institutions, one public and the other private. The Tax Authority is evaluated as meritocratic, relatively immune to corruption, and open to technological innovation. It is also defined as a closed institution that has done little to engage with its relevant public (i.e. the tax-paying citizenry), educating it on its civic obligations, and reducing the great disparities in the treatment of common tax-payers and economic elites (Evans 2013). This relative absence of Proactivity leads to the exclusion of the Tax Authority from the ranks of truly developmental institutions. In the case of Lisbon Euronext, it is not lack of Proactivity on the part of the institution, but the failure of these efforts to attract more Portuguese companies to list in the Exchange that produced a downgrade in its characterization as developmental. The downgrade in scores on Contribution to Development due to the weakness of proactivity in these two institutions gave it the pivotal role in the set-theoretic causal analysis.

Chapter 9

Institutional Survey Results

The second part of the study consisted of surveys of the personnel of all selected institutions conducted with the purpose of establishing the evaluation of each organization by the people employed in it and their general value orientations. The original proposal for the project argued that these surveys could provide a check on the evaluations of the institutions provided by the respective investigators and that a value profile of the personnel operating such strategic entities is as or more important than those routinely obtained from the general population. Surveys of this kind were not included in the preceding study of Latin American institutions. To our knowledge, this is the first time that a comparative institutional analysis of this kind has been attempted in Europe. Appendix A presents the questionnaire used for this part of the study.

Five of the six targeted organizations agreed to participate in the survey. The Tax Authority did not participate. The attitude of the top management in the other organizations ranged from ready and even enthusiastic acceptance in EDP (Energias de Portugal) and ASAE to a more cautious stance and protracted negotiations, especially with CTT-Correios and the Santa Maria Hospital. These differences are reflected in the respective response rates, as seen below. Once authorization was obtained, project staff proceeded to mail or e-mail questionnaires to personnel at all levels of the institution – from senior management to line workers. The introductory statement made clear that replies to the questionnaire would be entirely anonymous since neither names nor any other identifying information was requested. Anonymity was absolutely necessary in order to obtain valid answers to questions asking respondents to evaluate the organization in which they are currently employed over a range of dimensions, as well as provide self-evaluations on a number of personal value orientations. Appendix A presents this questionnaire.

Details of the timing and the forms in which surveys were conducted in each institution are presented in Appendix B. Most questionnaires were sent and responses received via an online platform. The CTT leadership insisted on paper questionnaires returned by mail. Response rates varied from an almost perfect 96 percent for EDP and a high 87 percent for ASAE to approximately

half of the contacted personnel in the Stock Exchange and the Postal System to just 3.4 percent in the Santa Maria Hospital. These differences must be taken into account in the following analysis of results. With the exception of the first two institutions, surveys in the remaining three cannot be considered statistically representative since participation was not determined by project personnel but by the respondents themselves.

Without sufficient support from the respective institutional leadership, project staff could do little to incentivize higher response rates. Despite this serious limitation, the absolute size of samples – including those obtained in CTT-Correios and the Santa Maria Hospital – represents valuable information since returned questionnaires give us a glimpse into the attitudes and value orientations of a sizable component of their respective personnel. The following sections present descriptive statistics of the resulting samples, as well as analyses of the perceived quality of each institution. We reserve for future publications the analysis of general value orientations.

A. Descriptives

Table 7 presents descriptive statistics of the sample broken down by institution and objective personal characteristics such as sex, gender, education, and occupation. As seen in the tables, the survey yielded sizable samples in four of the five institutions, especially the postal system. The small sample in Lisbon-Euronext is, in part, a reflection of the small size of the institution. Sixty percent of respondents were male and close to half have achieved generally high levels of education of institutional personnel.

Table 7 Descriptive Characteristics of the Institutional Survey

Variable	Values	N¹	%
Institution	Electricity Company (EDP)	288	21
	Food and Economic Security Company (ASAE)	256	19
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	231	17
	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	559	42
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	12	1
	Totals	1 346	100
Sex	Male	782	60
	Female	526	40
	Totals	1 308	100
Age	43.12 (mean)	1 346	
Education	Less than secondary	266	20
	Secondary complete or higher	419	32
	University degree or more	635	48
	Totals	1 320	100
Length of Employment	Seven years or less	496	38
	Eight to twelve years	195	15
	Thirteen years or more	622	47
	Totals	1 313	100
Occupation	Clerical and blue-collar	366	28
	Professional, technical	255	20
	Mid-management	508	39
	Senior management	170	13
	Totals	1 299	100
Number of Promotions	None	685	53
	One to three	360	28
	Four or more	252	19
	Totals	1 297	100

1) Missing data excluded

Only one-third of respondents occupied subordinate positions as clerks, mail carriers, or blue-collar workers; the rest were professional and technicians or managers at either intermediate or senior levels of the organization. Length of employment is bi-modal with close to 40 percent having been affiliated with the institution less than 7 years, but almost half having tenure of 13 years or more. The relative youth of ASAE – seven years – weighs significantly on these results as 100 percent of its respondents were in the lower tenure category. About one-half of respondents had never been promoted within the organization, while only one-fifth had received four promotions or more. As we will

see below, number of promotions, as well as status within the organization, weighs heavily on the distribution of perceptions of institutional quality in the sample.

B. General Evaluations

A battery of attitudinal items was constructed with the explicit purpose of reflecting opinions on each of the determinants of the institutional outcomes of interest described previously and of these outcomes themselves. Before submitting these data to multivariate analysis, we present selected frequency distributions broken down by the five participating organizations. These appear in Table 8.

Table 8-A Frequency Distributions of Selected Attitudinal Items by Institution

	ASAE		EDP	HSM	LSE	
	(Food and Economic	CTT	(Electricity	(Santa Maria	(Lisbon Stock	
Predictors	Security Authority) (P	ostal System)	of Portugal)	Hospital)	Exchange)	Totals
A. Internal						
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Meritocracy:						
			es and perform c noted in this orga			
Disagrees	39.4	62.2	0.0	70.2	36.4	45.6
Neither ¹	42.9	26.7	64.7	29.8	27.3	38.5
Agrees	17.7	11.1	35.3	0.0	36.3	15.9
Immunity to Corruption						
	"Most of the pe	ersonnel of this	institution is imi	mune to corruptio	n"	
Disagrees	1.6	12.6	0.0	42.9	0.0	12.8
Neither ¹	38.2	35.9	26.6	57.1	25	37.8
Agrees	60.2	51.5	73.4	0.0	75	49.4
No "Islands of Power":						
	to	their own inte	his institution th rests even if they er goals of the or	affect		
Agrees	32.4	54.1	15.8	0.0	41.7	32.4
Neither ¹	50.2	34.2	84.2	40.4	33.3	49.1
Disagrees	17.4	11.7	0.0	59.6	25	18.5

1) Includes "don't know" responses

Table 8-B Frequency Distributions of Selected Attitudinal Items by Institution

D. F.	ASAE (Food and Economic	CTT	EDP (Electricity	HSM (Santa Maria	LSE (Lisbon Stock	T . I
Predictors	Security Authority) (F	ostal System)	of Portugal)	Hospital)	Exchange)	Totals
B. External						
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Proactivity:						
	0	, ,		stitution actively i it or use its servic	es	
Disagrees	24.3	30.5	0.0	57.5	16.7	27.2
Neither ¹	56.2	38.2	34.4	42.5	16.7	41.3
Agrees	19.5	31.3	65.6	0.0	66.6	31.5
Technological Flexibility						
			ution seeks to be chnologies and p			
Disagrees	12.3	6.1	0.0	7.7	8.3	6.2
Neither ¹	15.9	11.7	1.8	16.4	33.3	11.3
Agrees	71.8	82.2	98.2	75.9	58.4	82.5
External Allies						
	th	is organization	tional cooperation and top decision e public administ	makers		
Disagrees	20.0	17.0	0.0	11.4	8.3	12.9
Neither ¹	57.4	49.8	64.7	63.0	16.7	44.9
Agrees	22.6	33.2	35.3	25.6	75.0	42.2

¹⁾ Includes "don't know" responses

The pattern of responses generally agrees with what we learned from the qualitative reports. The problematic character of Meritocracy in Portuguese institutions is reflected in the small minority (16 percent) who agreed that "People will be promoted within this organization if they are competent and follow the rules." Only in the two private entities (EDP and LSE) does this figure reach one-third or the sample. On the other hand, belief in the absence of corruption within the institution is endorsed by three-fourths of respondents in EDP and LSE and by half in the total sample. This last figure is brought down by the absence of positive views in the Santa Maria Hospital sample. The proportion who believes in immunity to corruption among Hospital personnel is exactly zero.9

Belief in the existence of "Islands of Power" within the organization was mixed, reflecting a skeptical stance. Half of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, a figure that reached a remarkable 84 percent among EDP personnel. In agreement with results of the qualitative study of CTT-Correios,

^{9.}This result must be evaluated with caution given the low response rate in this institution and the possibility that more critical employees self-selected into the sample.

the majority of respondents from this organization believed in the existence of islands of power ("quintas" as they are internally known) (Gomes Bezerra 2013). There are vast differences in the belief of a proactive orientation among institutional leaders: Two-thirds of the personnel of the private organizations (EDP and LSE) believe that such a stance is real, but the figure falls precipitously in the three public institutions, reaching exactly zero in the Santa Maria Hospital sample. This last result partially contradicts the qualitative study which insisted that, despite its internal shortcomings, the Hospital actively sought to engage with its patient base and respond to its concerns and complaints (Pires 2013)

On the other hand, the existence of technological openness and flexibility in Portuguese institutions – a consistent finding from the qualitative report – is supported by the pattern of responses to this survey. Eighty-two percent of respondents endorsed this view, with the belief in technological flexibility reaching a remarkable 98 percent among EDP personnel. In no case, does this view fall below half of the respective sample. Finally, over 40 percent of respondents assert that there is good institutional rapport between their organization and the top echelons of the Portuguese government, but this figure is pushed upwards by the 75 percent of LSE respondents who endorsed this statement. Least likely to do so are employees of ASAE and the Santa Maria Hospital, a pattern that corresponds to their characterization in the qualitative studies as increasingly "orphan" institutions.

C. Factor Analysis

While attitudinal items were associated *a priori* with specific predictors of institutional outcomes, they were submitted subsequently to a factor analysis in order to identify the latent dimensions that underlie the pattern of responses and the matrix of item inter-correlations. For this purpose, we made use of an exploratory principal components routine with orthogonal varimax rotation of the principal factors. Table 9 presents results of this analysis including latent factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00. Four such factors were identified by the analysis; jointly they account for 58 percent of common variance in the inter-correlation matrix. The likelihood ratio test yields a chi square value significant at the .0000 level.

The unrotated factor matrix is uninterpretable. To clarify its meaning, we rotated the four factors orthogonally. Results of this varimax routine are presented in the second panel of Table 9. It includes items with loadings of at least .50 in each factor. The wording of these items helps clarify the meaning of the underlying dimensions. Based on these results, the first, and most

important, factor is labeled "Meritocracy-Proactivity", as items reflecting each of these determinants load highly on it. The second factor is identified as "General Institutional Quality"; the third as "Immunity to Corruption"; and the fourth as "Universalism-Fairness". A perusal of the wording for the high loading items in each factor provides the rationale for these labels.

Table 9 Factor Analysis of Individual Perceptions of Institutional Characteristics

A. Principal Components: Factor Extraction

Factor	Eigenvalue	% Common Variance	Cumulative
I	4.226	0.282	0.282
II	1.877	0.125	0.407
III	1.426	0.095	0.502
IV	1.102	0.073	0.575
B. Varimax Rotation: Factor	Loadings		
Factor	Item		Loading
I. Meritocracy – Proactivity	16. The majority of leaders and managers o	f (institution) are honest and competent.	0.715
	19. There is good institutional cooperation -makers of the Portuguese public administr		0.578
	22. If they follow the rules and perform conthis organization.	mpetently, people will be promoted in	0.695
	23. The great majority of leaders in this inst persons that interact with it or use its servi	,	0.610
II. General Institutional Quality	12. The (institution) fulfills in a general way	the goals for which it was created.	0.636
	13. The adequate performance of its functi Portugal.	ons by (institution) is essential for	0.647
	17. In general, (institution) seeks to be up-t and modern procedures.	o-date in the use of new technologies	0.670
	18. The (institution) does everything in its pusers and clients.	power to provide services that satisfy its	0.535
III. Immunity to Corruption	20. There are groups within (institution) the even if they negatively affect the broader g		-0.648
	21. Most of the personnel of (institution) is	s immune to corruption.	0.684
	24. In general, the personnel of (institution) performance and the quality of the services		0.800
IV. Universalism – Fairness	15. Promotions in (institution) essentially d	epend on personal relations	-0.749
	26. Women are treated the same as men in Moving ahead or not depends on a person's	,	0.694

It is possible to construct indices for each of these latent dimensions by standardizing its item components, adding them, and dividing by their number. The resulting indices have means of approximately 0, and standard deviations of 1. Negative scores in each index indicate below-average evaluations of an institution by its surveyed personnel. Positive scores indicate the opposite. Table 10 presents the relevant results. In addition to the four indices constructed on the basis of the preceding factor analysis, the table also includes scores in a Generalized Trust scale constructed on the basis of three items used for this purpose in the European Social Survey and other surveys of the general population. For comparison, this scale was also standardized to mean 0, and standard deviation 1.

^{10.} The items are: a) "Most public officials are

Table 10 Mean Scores by Institution: Perceptions of Institutional Characteristics and Generalized Trust

Institution	Meritocracy – Proactivity	General Institutional Quality	Immunity to Corruption	Universalism – Fairness	General Trust
ASAE (Food and Economic Security)	-0.1133	-0.3198	0.1759	-0.2265	0.535
CTT (Postal System)	-0.2139	-0.0349	-0.0293	0.1329	-0.8197
EDP (Electricity of Portugal)	0.8392	0.4891	0.3346	-0.0332	0.6733
HSM (Santa Maria Hospital)	-0.4482	-0.1494	-0.584	-0.0317	0.6252
LSE (Lisbon Stock Exchange)	0.5717	-0.2317	0.2762	0.2995	-0.2827
Totals	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	0.003	0.000

As shown in the table, the two private institutions, EDP and LSE, have a considerable advantage in the key dimension of Meritocracy-Proactivity, while the three public institutions rank below average. The same general pattern is observable in the other three factors. In the case of Immunity to Corruption, ASAE joins the two private organizations on the positive side based of evaluations by its personnel. The worst performer in this case is the Santa Maria Hospital, a result that is in line with the analysis in the respective qualitative report, although it should be interpreted with caution given the previously noted low response rate (Pires 2013).

The pattern for Universalism-Fairness is somewhat different. The best evaluations on this dimension are accorded to Lisbon-Euronext; the EDP ranks about average and the worst performer is ASAE. In the view of its personnel, there is a great deal of arbitrariness and particularism in rule application within ASAE, a result attributable to the rather vertical and personalistic hierarchy of authority in the organization, as described in the institutional report (Contumélias 2013). In synthesis, EDP ranks at the top in the evaluations by

not interested in the problems of the average man"

b) "These days, a person does not really know whom he can count on"

c) "Most people don't really care what happens to the next fellow".

its own personnel in most dimensions of institutional quality, followed by the Stock Exchange, and then the public entities in different configurations. The worst performer is the Santa Maria Hospital whose staff evaluated the institution negatively in all dimensions.

Generalized Trust is not a dimension based on the preceding factor analysis and it refers to the individual views of respondents rather than their evaluations of their organizations. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the pattern of results in this case. The postal system personnel and the staff of the Stock Exchange emerge as the least "trusting", in stark comparison with those of ASAE, the Santa Maria Hospital, and particularly EDP. Personnel of the Electricity Company appears to be the most secure and the most confident in the behavior of other people. We have no ready explanation for these differences, but note them for future analysis.

Table 11 presents the distribution of index scores by two main objective predictors – sex and education. These results are worth noting on several counts. First, female respondents tend to be consistently more critical of their institution than their male counterparts. On the other hand, they exhibit more general trust than males. Second, least educated respondents evaluate their institutions more critically in terms of the key Meritocracy-Proactivity dimension, as well as a General Institutional Quality and Immunity to Corruption. They are also the most distrustful group. This last result is in agreement with expectations in the specialized literature (Alesina and LaFerrara 2002; Leigh 2006). Counter-intuitively, this group also evaluates their organizations most positively in Universalism-Fairness. This last result highlights the distinctness of the four dimensions identified in the prior factor analysis.

Table 11 Mean Indicators of Perceived Institutional Characteristics and Generalized Trust by Sex and Education

Predictor	Meritocracy -Proactivity	General Institutional Quality	Immunity to Corruption	Universalism – Fairness	Generalized Trust
Sex					
Males	0.0874	0.0426	0.0586	0.0406	-0.0214
Females	-0.1395	-0.0575	-0.0899	-0.0422	0.0382
Education				-	
Less than secondary	-0.1762	-0.098	-0.0334	0.1388	-0.5063
Secondary complete and higher	0.0095	0.0461	0.1047	0.0066	-0.1073
University degree or more	0.0714	0.0159	0.0555	-0.0474	0.2822
Totals	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.006	0.000

D. Determinants of Institutional Evaluations

We consider next what are the factors affecting perceptions of the surveyed personnel toward their respective institutions. For this purpose, we use as dependent variables the four indices derived from the factor analysis just presented and, as predictors, dummy variables representing each institution and the objective dimensions described previously. A preliminary perusal of the frequency distribution for each dependent variable indicates that they are either normally distributed (meritocracy-proactivity; universalism-fairness) or skewed toward the left (general institutional quality; immunity to corruption). Given the large sample, we decided that a logarithmic transformation of scores was unnecessary.

The models are based on ordinary lest squares (OLS) routines using robust standard error and list-wise deletion of missing data. There is general agreement that list-wise deletion represents the most conservative way of handling missing data. Various data imputation routines inflate sample sizes increasing the probability of falsely identifying significant effects (Firebaugh 2008). We use a nested, step-wise procedure with institutional effects only included in the first model and the remaining predictors added in the second. Dummy variable regression requires the exclusion of one category that becomes the reference point for the other effects. ASAE is the omitted institution and the remaining institutional effects must be interpreted as relative to it.

Table 12 presents nested regression of the key Meritocracy-Proactivity factor. The first model shows that, relative to ASAE, the EDP and LSE – the two private institutions – receive significantly better evaluations while the Santa Maria Hospital receives significantly worse ones. There were no statistically significant differences between ASAE and CTT-Correios. The addition of other objective predictors leave these results unchanged. The only other significant effects are those of occupational status and number of promotions received in the past. Not surprisingly, senior managers of the respective organizations and personnel who have received one or more promotions are significantly more inclined to rank it positively on this dimension.

The model does a fair job in explaining variation in this first evaluative dimension, accounting for 40 percent of total variance. Further analysis revealed no significant interaction effects: models run separately for each institution (including ASAE, but excluding LSE because of too few cases), essentially reproduced results presented above.

Table 12 Determinants of "Meritocracy-Proactivity" in Portugal, 2013

Predictor:		1	П
Institution ¹	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	-0.101	-0.126
	Electricity Company (EDP)	0.952 ***	0.770 ***
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	-0.335 ***	-0.362 ***
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	0.685 ***	0.579 **
Other predictors:			
Age			-0.001
Male			-0.007
Education ²	Secondary complete or higher		0.012
	University degree or more		-0.103
Length of Employment ³	Between 7 and 12 years		0.075
	Thirteen years or more		-0.107
Occupational Status ⁴	Professional, technical		0.013
	Mid-management		0.052
	Senior management		0.209 **
Number of Promotions ⁵	One to three		0.134 **
	Four or more		0.358 ***
constant		-0.113	-0.070
N		1281	1192
R ²		0.371	0.398
TMSE		0.597	0.582

1) ASAE (Food and Economic Security Authority) is the reference category 2) Less than secondary is the reference category 3) Less than seven years is the reference category 4) Clerical and blue-collar is the reference category 5) No promotion is the reference category 5) No promotion is the reference category *pc.05***pc.05***pc.01****pc.001.

Regressions for "General Institutional Quality" are presented in Table 13. In this case, ASAE comes at the bottom, with evaluations of its performance on this factor being significantly worse than those of EDP, CTT, and even the Santa Maria Hospital. Again, EDP displays the strongest positive effect, followed at a distance by the Postal System. A perusal of item components of this index (see Table 9) offers a clue for the negative effects of ASAE based on the low evaluations by its personnel on several of these items.

The addition of other predictors leaves these institutional effects unchanged. Once again, respondents who had received one or more promotions in the past and mid- and senior managers voice significantly more positive views of their organization. Explained variance is poorer in this case, dropping to less than half the level noted for Meritocracy-Proactivity. As before, there are no significant interaction effects, with separate analyses by institution basically reproducing the results just noted.

Table 13 Determinants of "General Institutional Quality" in Portugal, 2013

Predictor:		1	П
Institution ¹	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	0.285 ***	0.309 ***
	Electricity Company (EDP)	0.809 ***	0.797 ***
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	0.57 *	0.217 *
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	0.088	0.100
Other predictors:			
Age			-0.002
Male			-0.071
Education ²	Secondary complete or higher		0.073
	University degree or more		-0.138
Length of Employment ³	Between 7 and 12 years		0.054
	Thirteen years or more		-0.034
Occupational Status ⁴	Professional, technical		-0.034
	Mid-management		0.164
	Senior management		0.237
Number of Promotions ⁵	One to three		0.102
	Four or more		0.184
constant		-0.320	-0.279
N		1291	1200
R ²		0.144	0.169
TMSE		0.670	0.656

1) ASAE (Food and Economic Security Authority) is the reference category
2) Less than secondary is the reference category
3) Less than seven years is the reference category
4) Clerical and blue-collar is the reference category
5) No promotion is the reference category

* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001.

The pattern of effects on the third dimension, "Immunity to Corruption", is quite different. These are presented in Table 14. There are no significant differences between evaluations of ASAE and the Stock Exchange, but those of CTT and, especially, the Santa Maria Hospital are much worse leading to strong negative coefficients. The only significant positive effect is again associated with the energy company, but it drops to insignificance once other predictors enter the equation. The greater vulnerability to corruption in the Santa Maria Hospital is, once again, highlighted by the corresponding strong negative coefficient.

The addition of other predictors barely changes these results. In this case, the only significant effect is associated with professionals and technicians and *not* with managers. These subordinate personnel tend to assign better scores in this dimension to the respective organization than their superiors. Large institutional differences in perceived Immunity to Corruption and no other predictor account for the sizable explained variance in this third factor: 27 percent.

Table 14 Determinants of "Immunity to Corruption" in Portugal, 2013

Predictor:		I	II
Institution ¹	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	-0.205 ***	-0.262 ***
	Electricity Company (EDP)	0.159 ***	0.085
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	-0.760 ***	-0.815 ***
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	0.100	0.099
Other predictors:			
Age			0.001
Male			-0.041
Education ²	Secondary complete or higher		0.059
	University degree or more		-0.063
Length of Employment ³	Between 7 and 12 years		0.007
	Thirteen years or more		0.020
Occupational Status ⁴	Professional, technical		0.121*
	Mid-management		0.035
	Senior management		0.064
Number of Promotions ⁵	One to three		-0.027
	Four or more		0.101
constant		0.176	0.162
N		1280	1192
R ²		0.251	0.274
TMSE		0.516	0.513

1) ASAE (Food and Economic Security Authority) is the reference category 2) Less than secondary is the reference category 3) Less than seven years is the reference category 4) Clerical and blue-collar is the reference category 5) No promotion is the reference category *p<.05***p<.05***p<.01****p<.001.

The pattern of effects in the normally-distributed Universalism-Fairness index is also unique, again showing that the factor analysis tapped into different evaluative dimensions. Results are presented in Table 15. Relative to ASAE, the postal system, the hospital, and the energy company are evaluated as more universalistic in their hiring and promotions practices and as fairer to women. The result is attributable to the hierarchical and male-dominated structure of authority in the ASAE (a pattern that may change with the departure of its long-serving director). The significant coefficient associated with EDP disappears when other predictors enter the equation, but the other two institutional effects remain.

Table 15 Determinants of "Universalism - Fairness" in Portugal, 2013

Predictor:		1	Ш
Institution ¹	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	0.359***	0.273***
	Electricity Company (EDP)	0.193**	-0.001
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	0.195*	0.217*
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	0.526	0.469
Other predictors:			
Age			0.002
Male			0.041
Education ²	Secondary complete or higher		-0.078
	University degree or more		-0.167
Length of Employment ³	Between 7 and 12 years		0.025
	Thirteen years or more		-0.038
Occupational Status ⁴	Professional, technical		-0.103
	Mid-management		-0.006
	Senior management		0.149
Number of Promotions ⁵	One to three		0.115*
	Four or more		0.381***
constant		-0.227	-0.214
N		1289	1198
R ²		0.03	0.067
TMSE		0.771	0.749

1) ASAE (Food and Economic Security Authority) is the reference category 2) Less than secondary is the reference category 3) Less than seven years is the reference category 4) Clerical and blue-collar is the reference category 5) No promotion is the reference category p

p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001.

Among other predictors, the only significant coefficient is associated with number of promotions. Predictably, having been promoted once or more leads to greater perceptions of the institution as universalistic and fair. The overall model does a poor predictive job in this instance, accounting for less than 6 percent of total variance. However, an analysis of interaction effects does reveal significant differences in the pattern of effects among institutions. These results are presented in Table 16, including significant effects only. The already noted influence of number of promotions on positive institutional evaluations is present in three out of the four organizations (no separate analysis of the Stock Exchange was conducted for reasons already discussed).

Results for the EDP are at variance with the rest of the sample, registering several significant and unexpected effects. Within the EDP, males are significantly more likely to evaluate the institution as fair in its hiring and promotions. Better educated functionaries, especially those with a university degree are *less* likely to judge the organization as universalistic, as are those with more years of work experience within it. These negative results are only partially neutralized by the more positive evaluations rendered by the senior

managers. These effects, positive and negative, visibly increase explained variance, tripling the corresponding figure for the total sample. The pattern of results makes clear that there is little consensus within the personnel of EDP regarding this fourth dimension of perceived institutional quality. The results gain additional significance because the sample in this instance can be regarded as fully representative of EDP's personnel.

Table 16 Determinants of "Universalism – Fairness" by Institution¹

	ASAE	CTT	EDP	HSM
			0.320*	
Secondary complete or higher			-0.289*	
University degree or more			-0.432*	
Professional, technical				
Mid-management				
Senior management			0.446*	
Between 7 and 12 years				
Thirteen years or more			-0.489*	
One to three				
Four or more		.254*	0.478**	.719*
	-0.530	0.199	-0.122	0.355
	230	510	255	197
	0.024	0.045	0.174	0.098
	0.863	0.698	0.659	0.828
	University degree or more Professional, technical Mid-management Senior management Between 7 and 12 years Thirteen years or more One to three	Secondary complete or higher University degree or more Professional, technical Mid-management Senior management Between 7 and 12 years Thirteen years or more One to three Four or more -0.530 230 0.024	Secondary complete or higher University degree or more Professional, technical Mid-management Senior management Between 7 and 12 years Thirteen years or more One to three Four or more -0.530 0.199 230 510 0.024 0.045	O.320 *

Only significant effects presented.
 See table 9 for reference category.

^{*} p< .05 ** p< .01.

Chapter 10

Values

Values are general orientations said to underlie the normative system of societies and the behaviors and preferences of individuals. Survey research has focused on individual values and a number of scales have been constructed purporting to tap into these basic psycho-social orientations, either in single countries or cross-nationally. For the most part, surveys have been conducted on convenience samples (e.g. students) or probability samples of the general population (Bardi and Schwartz 2003; Inglehart, 1997). Although useful and important, there is a case for arguing that samples of the personnel of major institutions in a given country are even more strategic because this personnel occupies meaningful, often key roles performing tasks that affect everyone. While knowing the values of the average person-in-the-street is important, measuring those of engineers and managers in the energy company or medical personnel in the public health service may, for certain purposes, be more significant.

The Schwartz PVQ Scale

Our Institutional Survey included the 21-item Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) developed by Shalom Schwartz and his associates to tap an interrelated set of ten value orientations. The PVQ has been incorporated into the European Social Survey (ESS), providing a ready standard against which to evaluate our results. The values measured by this instrument are not *ad hoc*, but are held to represent a comprehensive and cross-nationally valid set of the principal orientations held by individuals. This claim is backed by a large number of studies conducted among diverse samples in many different countries. Schwartz and his collaborators claim that the same value configuration emerges in almost all cases and that it is consistently associated with objective individual characteristics such as age, gender, and education (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Schwartz and Bardi 2001).

The extensive theoretical and empirical work dedicated to identifying a comprehensive set of value dimensions and creating a reliable measure of them is what persuaded the ESS leaders to incorporate it into their surveys. These values and their definitions are as follows:

- 1) **Power:** Social status and prestige; control or dominance over people and resources.
- **2) Achievement:** Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.
- 3) Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.
- 4) Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.
- **5) Self-direction:** Independent thought and action: choosing, creating, and exploring.
- **6) Universalism:** Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and of nature.
- **7) Benevolence:** Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.
- **8) Tradition:** Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provided the self.
- **9) Conformity:** Restraint of actions, inclination, or impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
- **10) Security:** Safety, harmony, and stability of society, or relationships, and of self.

These ten evaluative dimensions are not independent. They are said instead to be related systematically, as some are conceptually closer than others. Schwartz's theory asserts that they can be arranged along two axes: "Openness to Change vs Conservation" and "Self-transcendence vs Self-enhancement." The resulting conceptual scheme is presented in Figure 4. Value dimensions that are closer is this conceptual diagram can be merged into composite indicators, depending on the particular setting and sample. The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) was designed to measure all ten orientations reliably. To do so, however, it comprises a large number of items making its inclusion in multi-purpose surveys, such as the ESS, unfeasible. For this reason, the author devised the 21-item PVQ questionnaire where each value is measured by two or, at most, three empirical items. Each item is a hypothetical portrait of a person and the respondent is asked: "how much like you is this person." Answers are coded along a six-point scale from: "Very much like me" to "not at all like me". By asking respondents to compare the value portrait to themselves rather than themselves to the portrait the items direct attention only to specific aspects of "the other" that are described, rather than distracting attention to multiple other aspects of the self (Schwartz 2003; Schwartz and Bardi 2001).

Figure 4




Table 17 presents the twenty-one items, their means and medians, and the percentages endorsing the extreme scores, coded as 1 and 6 respectively. It also includes, in summary fashion, results of a confirmatory factor analysis testing whether empirical indicators actually reflect the relevant latent value dimensions. As shown in the Table, the corresponding coefficients linking latent to measured scores are, without exception, highly significant. This confirms, in principle, the hypothesized conceptual structure.

Table 17 Item Scores in Schwartz's PVQ Scale – Portuguese Institutional Survey – 2013

	Relevant Value	Mean Score	"Not at all like me"	"Very much like me"	Confirmatory Factor Coefficient	ESS Mean – Portugal ³	t4
Item ¹		(1 - 6)	%	%	Z-value ²	(1 – 6)	
34. A person who assigns much importance to show his/her capacities. Wants others to admire what s/he does.	Achievement	3.68	4.19	8.89	32.07***	4.20	11.62***
43. A person for whom it is important to be successful. S/he likes to receive the applause of others	Achievement	4.00	2.14	9.66	40.95***	3.97	3.97*
42. A person for whom it is important to help others around him/her. Concerned with the welfare of others.	Benevolence	4.79	0.26	22.74	37.71***	4.51	13.89***
48. A person for whom it is important to be loyal to his/her friends. S/he is dedicated to people who are close to him/her.	Benevolence	5.03	0.17	32.74	36.54***	4.70	16.29***
37. A person who believes that people should do what they are ordered to do. Thinks that people should always observe the rules even when there is no one around them.	Conformity	3.88	4.19	10.51	20.10***	3.86	2.61*
46. A person for whom it is important to behave always as s/he should. Avoids to do things that others may find wrong.	Conformity	3.76	2.74	9.66	26.91***	4.01	5.62**
40. A person for whom it is important to have a good time. Likes to treat him/herself well.	Hedonism	4.30	1.20	12.14	31.55***	4.04	11.32***
51. A person who seeks to take advantage of all opportunities to amuse him/herself. It is important for him/her to do things that give pleasure.	Hedonism	4.10	1.45	11.37	29.95***	3.57	17.38***
32. A person for whom it is important to be rich. Wants to have lots of money and expensive things.	Power	2.03	30.94	0.43	9.88**	2.80	17.90***
47. A person for whom it is important that others respect him/her. Wants others to do what s/he says	Power	3.25	4.96	2.65	14.43**	4.09	20.73***
35. A person for whom it is important to live in a place where s/he feels secure. Avoids anything that would put his/her security at risk.	Security	3.99	2.22	13.16	24.34***	4.64	15.68***
44. A person for whom it is important that the government guarantees his/her security against all threats. Wants the state to be strong so that it can defend its citizens.	Security	4.36	1.54	18.8	22.73	4.61	4.85**
31. A person who gives importance to have new ideas, be creative. Likes to do things his/her way.	Self- -Direction	3.74	3.50	4.27	14.33**	4.26	12.48***
41. A person for whom it is important to take his/her own decisions about what to do. Likes to be free and not dependent on others.	Self- -Direction	4.39	0.60	14.7	17.89**	4.51	0.74 n.s.5
36. A person who likes surprises and always looks for new things to do. Thinks that it is important to do many things in life.	Stimulation	3.88	2.05	8.46	26.63***	3.87	0.98 n.s5
37. A person who looks for adventure and likes to take risks. Likes to have an exciting life.	Stimulation	3.10	6.24	2.74	27.86***	2.79	2.96*
39. A person for whom it is important to be humble and modest. Seeks not to call attention to him/herself.	Tradition	4,39	0,85	16,24	12.56**	4,29	5.37**

	Relevant Value	Mean Score	"Not at all like me"	"Very much like me"	Confirmatory Factor Coefficient	ESS Mean – Portugal ³	t4
Item ¹		(1 - 6)	%	%	Z-value ²	(1 - 6)	
50. A person who gives importance to tradition. Does everything in his/her power to act according to his/her religion and family.	Tradition	3,62	4,53	8,89	11.64**	4,18	11.56***
33. A person who believes that everyone in the world should be treated the same. Thinks that everyone should have the same opportunities in life.	Universalism	4,94	0,51	33,50	26.29***	4,81	7.28***
28. A person for whom it is important to listen to others different from him/herself. Even when disagreeing with someone, believes important to understand that person.	Universalism	4,56	0,60	16,15	22.18***	4,18	15.68***
49. A person who seriously believes that people should protect nature. Protecting the environment is important to him/her.	Universalism	4,79	0,26	27,52	29.81***	4,58	10.29***
		N = 1170)			2046	

Average scores above 3 in each item may be interpreted as endorsing it; respondents strongly identifying with the corresponding value-portrait tend to be significantly more numerous than those rejecting it. The opposite happens with scores below 3. For comparison, mean scores of the Portuguese sample in the latest available European Social Survey (ESS) are presented in the last column of Table 17. Overall, average scores of institutional personnel and of the general Portuguese population sampled by ESS resemble each other, albeit with some notable differences. Because of large sample sizes almost all differences are statistically significant. In terms of the absolute size of these average differences, institutional personnel tend to be more concerned with the welfare of others than the general public, with many more respondents in the Institutional Survey strongly endorsing the corresponding ("Benevolence") items. On the other hand, "Power", "Security", and "Tradition" tend to be preferred by the general public.

For example, there is a major difference between both samples in the importance assigned to being obeyed by others (Power), much less common among institutional personnel than in the general population. The same is true for respect for traditional values (item 50), significantly more common among the latter. For the most part, however, scores follow a similar pattern in both samples: less interested in power and risk-taking and more in the defense of equality, loyalty to friends, and leading a secure life.

Our multivariate analysis of these items was not limited to confirming their correspondence with the hypothesized dimensions, but went on to examine the latent structure underlying the observed matrix of inter-correlations. For this purpose, we submitted the empirical scores to an exploratory factor *p.05 **p.01 ***p.001.

¹⁾ Item number in the Institutional Questionnaire.
2) Significance level of Z scores indicated by asterisks
3) Average scores in ESS
4) Difference-of-means t-test. Significance level of difference indcated by asterisks.
5) Not statistically significant

analysis using a principal component routine with Varimax orthogonal rotation of the principal factors. Results are presented in Table 18. The analysis yielded five factors with eigenvalues (indicating percent of total variance explained) greater than 1. The extracted factors are uninterpretable but, after rotation, a clear pattern emerges.

Table 18 Exploratory Factor Analysis of PVC Value Items – Portuguese Institutional Survey, 2013

Factor	I	II	Ш	IV	V
Name	Universalism- Benevolence	Achievement – Power	Conformity – Tradition	Hedonism	Stimulation
Eigenvalue	5.386	2.111	1.852	1.122	1.011
Percent of Common Variance ¹	0.256	0.100	0.088	0.053	0.048
Factor loadings of defining items: ^{2,3}					
V ₃₃	.663				
V ₃ 8	.647				
V ₃₉	.532				
V42	.732				
V48	.681				
V49	.646				
V ₃₁		.524			
V ₃₂		.587			
V ₃₄		.718			
V ₄₃		.646			
V47		.597			
V ₃₇			.678		
V46			.732		
V ₅ 0			.619		
V40				.689	
V ₅₁				.711	
V ₃ 6					.749
V ₄₅					.790
	N = 1109				

¹⁾ Unrotated factor matrix 2) Factor-item correlations. Only loadings over .50 are included 3) See Table 17 for value-

item identification.

Table 18 lists value items sequentially and includes factor loadings greater than .50. These loadings help define the actual meaning of each latent dimension. The wording of each item and the value that it is supposed to represent are listed in Table 17. The first factor yields an eigenvalue of over 5.0 and by itself explains one-fourth of common variance in the inter-correlations matrix. Items loading

highly on this factor are those hypothesized to represent Universalism and Benevolence in Schwartz's theoretical scheme. The factor is labeled accordingly.

The second factor accounts for 10 percent of common variance and is defined mainly by items expected to embody Achievement and Power orientations. The third, accounting for 9 percent of variance, reflects primarily Conformist and Traditional values (although one of the items supposed to define the latter does not load highly on it). The remaining factors are relatively minor, each accounting for about 5 percent of common variance. The fourth represents a Hedonistic orientation being clearly defined by the two items defining this value. Similarly, the final factor is defined by the two items embodying a search for Stimulation in life.

Overall, results of this analytic exercise correspond fairly well to those theorized by Schwartz and his associates. Eight of the ten hypothesized latent values are present in our results. (Absent are values of Security and Self-direction, although one of the items measuring the latter loads significantly in the Achievement-Power factor). Moreover, composite factors embodying more than one hypothetical value bring together dimensions that are conceptually close in the theoretical scheme presented in Figure 4. In this sense, they also support the original formulation.

The final task for this analysis consists in examining determinants of each of the five latent dimensions just identified. For this, we constructed indices of each factor, consisting of the sum of standardized items loading highly on each, divided by the number of such items. These five factorial indices were then regressed on a series of objective predictors, using an OLS routine with robust standard errors. Predictors include dummy variables for the five institutions included (the Food and Economic Security Authority – ASAE – serves as the reference category); age, gender, educational level, occupational status, years of service and number of promotions received. Models are nested, with the first column including only institutional predictors, and the second adding the rest.

Tables 19 – 23 present the results. A first general conclusion is that the five value dimensions are poorly accounted for by the model. This is due to two facts: First, there is relatively little variation in the sample as a whole, with responses tending to coalesce around the mean for the five indices. Second, there is also little variation across the five institutions, a pattern that contrasts with significant variance in perceptions of institutional quality, as discussed previously. The relative uniformity in value orientations across the five institutions can be gleaned from standardized scores of each in the ten originally hypothesized dimensions. These are presented in Appendix C.

^{11.} These indices were constructed following Schwartz's recommended methodology consisting of averaging all twenty-one responses by each individual into a single score. This score is then subtracted from each item response. The purpose is to adjust for individual tendencies to endorse high or low scores. Items thus recoded were added and divided by their number. The indices thus constructed are distributed normally or near normally for all five factorially-derived dimensions.

Table 19 Determinants of "Universalism-Benevolence" in Portugal, 2013

Predictor:		Į1	II ²
Institution ³	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	-0.165***	-0.118**
		(0.036)	(0.050)
	Electricity Company (EDP)	-0.169***	-0.124*
		(0.042)	(0.065)
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	-0.022	-0.008
		(0.045)	(0.060)
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	0.055	0.053
		(0.139)	(0.143)
Other predictors:			
Age			0.010***
			(0.002)
Male			-0.017
			(0.031)
Education ⁴	Secondary complete or higher		0.022
			(0.041)
	University degree or more		0.080
			(0.051)
Length of Employment ⁵	Between 7 and 12 years		-0.011
			(0.051)
	Thirteen years or more		-0.023
			(0.043)
Occupational Status ⁶	Professional, technical		0.067
			(0.045)
	Mid-management		-0.032
			(0.045)
	Senior management		0.001
	·		(0.059)
Number of Promotions ⁷	One to three		-0.032
			(0.035)
	Four or more		-0.026
Constant		0.832***	0.364***
		(0.030)	(0.100)
N		1,170	1,092
R ²		0.028	0.069
F Statistic		8.480*** (df=4; 1165)	5.310*** (df = 15; 107

¹⁾ Only institutions included as predictors 2) Institutions plus other predictors included 3) ASAE (Food and Economic Security Authority) is the reference category 4) Less than secondary schooling is the reference category 5) Less than seven years is the reference category 6) Clerical and blue-collar work is the reference category 7) No promotion is the reference category *p<.05*** p<.05**** p<.01***** p<.001.

Table 20 Determinants of "Achievement-Power" in Portugal, 2013

Predictor:		l ₁	II ²
Institution ³	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	0.067	0.200***
		(0.043)	(0.059)
	Electricity Company (EDP)	0.220***	0.266***
		(0.049)	(0.077)
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	0.146***	0.219***
		(0.053)	(0.072)
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	0.068	0.094
		(0.165)	(0.171)
Other predictors:			
Age			-0.006**
			(0.002)
Male			-0.003
			(0.037)
Education ⁴	Secondary complete or higher		0.046
			(0.049)
	University degree or more		0.056
			(0.060)
Length of Employment ⁵	Between 7 and 12 years		-0.027
			(0.061)
	Thirteen years or more		-0.043
			(0.051)
Occupational Status ⁶	Professional, technical		-0.030
			(0.053)
	Mid-management		0.131**
			(0.054)
	Senior management		0.242***
	<u>-</u>		(0.070)
Number of Promotions ⁷	One to three		0.012
			(0.042)
	Four or more		0.032
			(0.058)
Constant		-0.786***	-0.721***
		(0.036)	(0.120)
N		1,170	1,092
R ²		0.020	0.062
F Statistic		5.908* (df=4; 1165)	4.764*** (df = 15; 1076)
		(41-4, 1105)	(41 - 15, 10/0)

¹⁾ Only institutions included as predictors 2) Institutions plus other predictors included 3) ASAE (Food and Economic Security Authority) is the reference category 4) Less than secondary schooling is the reference category 5) Less than seven years is the reference category 6) Clerical and blue-collar work is the reference category 7) No promotion is the reference category *p<.05*
*** p<.05*
*** p<.01.**** p<.001.

Table 21 Determinants of "Conformity-Tradition" in Portugal, 2013

Predictor:		l ₁	II2
Institution ³	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	0.039	-0.275***
		(0.061)	(0.081)
	Electricity Company (EDP)	-0.081	-0.297***
		(0.069)	(0.105)
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	-0.131*	-0.330***
		(0.074)	(0.098)
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	-0.164	-0.322
		(0.231)	(0.233)
Other predictors:			
Age			0.003
			(0.003)
Male			0.120**
			(0.051)
Education ⁴	Secondary complete or higher		-0.079
			(0.067)
	University degree or more		-0.099
			(0.082)
Length of Employment ⁵	Between 7 and 12 years		0.139*
			(0.083)
	Thirteen years or more		0.182***
			(0.070)
Occupational Status ⁶	Professional, technical		-0.114
			(0.073)
	Mid-management		-0.218***
			(0.074)
	Senior management		-0.432***
			(0.096)
Number of Promotions ⁷	One to three		0.075
			(0.057)
	Four or more		-0.013
			(0.080)
Constant		-0.252***	-0.121
		(0.051)	(0.164)
N		1,170	1,092
R ²		0.008	0.078
F Statistic		2.367* (df=4; 1165)	6.101*** (df = 15; 107
		(41-4, 1105)	(41 - 15, 10/

¹⁾ Only institutions included as predictors 2) Institutions plus other predictors included 3) ASAE (Food and Economic Security Authority) is the reference category 4) Less than secondary schooling is the reference category 5) Less than seven years is the reference category 6) Clerical and blue-collar work is the reference category 7) No promotion is the reference category **P< .05***p< .01*****

Table 22 Determinants of "Hedonism" in Portugal, 2013

Predictor:		J1	2
Institution ³	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	0.262***	0.273***
		(0.058)	(0.079)
	Electricity Company (EDP)	0.164**	0.195**
		(0.066)	(0.104)
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	0.117*	0.135
		(0.071)	(0.097)
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	0.092	0.190
		(0.221)	(0.230)
Other predictors:			
Age			-0.015***
			(0.003)
Male			-0.091*
			(0.050)
Education ⁴	Secondary complete or higher		0.090
			(0.066)
	University degree or more		-0.097
			(0.081)
Length of Employment ⁵	Between 7 and 12 years		-0.099
			(0.082)
	Thirteen years or more		-0.001
			(0.069)
Occupational Status ⁶	Professional, technical		-0.043
			(0.072)
	Mid-management		0.065
			(0.072)
	Senior management		0.053
	·		(0.095)
Number of Promotions ⁷	One to three		-0.063
			(0.057)
	Four or more		0.025
	· 		(0.079)
Constant		0.007	0.749***
		(0.048)	(0.161)
N		1,170	1,092
R ²		0.018	0.052
F Statistic		5.477*** (df=4; 1165)	3.944*** (df = 15; 107

¹⁾ Only institutions included as predictors 2) Institutions plus other predictors included 3) ASAE (Food and Economic Security Authority) is the reference category 4) Less than secondary schooling is the reference category 5) Less than seven years is the reference category 6) Clerical and blue-collar work is the reference category 7) No promotion is the reference category *p<.05*** p<.05*** p<.01.**** p<.001.

Table 23 Determinants of "Stimulation" in Portugal, 2013

Predictor:		Į1	II ²
Institution ³	Postal System (CTT – Correios)	-0.175***	0.042
		(0.066)	(0.090)
	Electricity Company (EDP)	-0.094	0.080
		(0.076)	(01.117)
	Santa Maria Hospital (HSM)	-0.348***	-0.222**
		(0.081)	0.109)
	Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE)	0.492*	0.615**
		(0.252)	(0.259)
Other predictors:			
Age			-0.012***
			(0.003)
Male			0.068
			(0.057)
Education ⁴	Secondary complete or higher		-0.020
			(0.075)
	University degree or more		-0.038
			(0.092)
Length of Employment ⁵	Between 7 and 12 years		-0.032
	•		(0.093)
	Thirteen years or more		-0.204***
			(0.078)
Occupational Status ⁶	Professional, technical		0.091
	•		(0.081)
	Mid-management		0.123
			(0.082)
	Senior management		0.289***
			(0.107)
Number of Promotions ⁷	One to three		0.004
			(0.064)
	Four or more		-0.073
			(0.089)
Constant		-0.392***	-0.039
		(0.055)	(0.182)
N		1,170	1,092
R ²		0.023	0.071
F Statistic		6.730***	 5.491***
		(df=4; 1165)	(df = 15; 1076)

¹⁾ Only institutions a) Only institutions included as predictors
bincluded as predictors
lnstitutions plus other predictors included
AsAE (Food and Economic Security Authority) is the reference category
best than secondary schooling is the reference category
bless than seven years is the reference category
bless than seven years is the reference category
bless that seven years is the reference category
bless that seven years is the reference category
bless that seven years is the reference category 6) Clerical and blue-collar is the reference category 7) No promotion is the reference category * p< .05 *** p< .01.

Scores in the first latent value – Universalism/Benevolence – were significantly lower among respondents in the postal system and the energy company, relative to those in the ASAE. Aside from these differences, the only significant effect is that of age, with older respondents being much more likely to display this value. This accords with past results in the literature (Schwartz 2011). There are significant differences among institutions on the second latent factor – Achievement/Power. Relative to the reference institution, such values are more prevalent among the personnel of all other organizations and, in three of them, significantly so. In particular, the energy company (EDP) personnel appears to be the most achievement-oriented. A perusal of standardized value scores in Appendix C also shows that ASAE respondents were particularly low in achievement orientation, a finding worth further attention. Older respondents were much less achievement-oriented while, on the other side, managers at all levels were significantly more likely to display this value.

The pattern of determinants of Conformity/Tradition is more complex. Relative to ASAE, personnel in all other institutions were much less likely to endorse this value, indicating a more independent and less tradition-bound stance. Three of these institutional effects are highly significant. The full model indicates that Conformism is more common among males and that it increases significantly with years of service, the effect being particularly strong among those with 13-plus years of employment in the same agency. The stilting influence of "bureaucracy" on long-serving personnel, originally noted by Merton (1968a) and supported by a long line of subsequent research, is well reflected in this result. On the contrary, managers, as opposed to subordinate employees (the reference category), are much less likely to be bound by traditional rules, the effect being stronger among senior personnel. This finding represents good news reflecting a more modern, more independent orientation among those in charge of Portuguese institutions. It is also in line with past theory that identifies the conformist "bureaucratic personality" as most commonly encountered among clerks and other subordinate personnel (Merton 1968a, b).

A hedonistic orientation is least prevalent among ASAE's personnel and significantly more common among postal workers, energy company employees, and hospital personnel. The latter effect disappears when other predictors enter the equation, but the other two institutional effects remain. Otherwise, this value orientation is accounted for by age and gender: older respondents are significantly less likely to display it; males also evince a less hedonistic orientation. No other predictor affected this value. Thus, in this sample at least, males appeared to be the more stoic gender, bent on following the rules and defending tradition and less pleasure-seeking than their female colleagues.

^{12.} The effect associated with the Lisbon Stock Exchange is also highly positive. Its lack of significance is attributable to the small institutional sample.

Stimulation (a composite of risk-taking and search for novelty) is negatively affected by age, it is also significantly reduced by long years of service. A taste for risk and novel experiences seemingly goes away with age and the onset of a bureaucratic personality. On the positive side, senior managers are much more likely to display this orientation. Finally, the small sample of personnel in the Lisbon Stock Exchange also displays a notably strong inclination for risk-taking and innovation. This last effect is attributable to the key functions of this institution and the character of responsibilities for its personnel, these being precisely associated with the management of investments and market risk.

To examine the possibility of interaction effects, we replicated the analysis individually for each of the four institutions for which a sufficient number of cases are available. We present results in Table 24 without additional commentary. There are few interaction effects worth noting and the pattern of determinants of the five value dimensions reproduces, by and large, those noted previously.

Table 24 Determinants of Value Orientations by Institution Portuguese Institutional Survey, 2013¹

	Univer	Universalism-Benevolence ³	3enevol	ence ³	Achie	vement	Achievement – Power ³	er³	Confor	mity – T	Conformity - Tradition ³	ار		Hedonism ³	sm³		Stimula	Stimulation (Risk-taking) ³	sk-takiı	³,
Predictor ²	ASAE	СТТ	EDP	HSM	ASAE	CTT	EDP F	HSM /	ASAE C	стт Е	EDP H	HSM A	ASAE	СТТ	EDP	HSM	ASAE	СП	EDP 1	HSM
Age	.013***	.013*** .007*** .014***	.014***		012**		011					Ÿ 	J24***	024***013***016**	.016**		032***	013**		
Male										*161.	.223*									
Education																				
Secondary or more	.354**					124**						'	422*							
University degree or more	*892											' 	424*							
Years of Service																				
Seven to twelve years														287**						
Thrteen years or more																				
Occupational Status																				
Professional, technical		.125*								3	372**									
Mid-management						.318*** .316**	.316**		4:-	417***							353*	.274*		
Senior management						.384**			9:-	610***583***	83***								.397* .	.708*
Number of Promotions																				
One to three											.333**	' 	296*				317*			
Four or more										ζ.	**865.									
Constant	.001	.373	.158	.429	250	793	.060453		685:-	376	9270	045	1.625	.933	.833	.835	1.378	.027	.123 -1.105	1.105
R ²	.052	.045	.083	.117	.074	.092	. 780.	.049	490.	741.	.125 .0	670.	060.	.032	.057	.085	.131	890.	890.	.121
Z	203	478	229	173	203	478	229	173	203 4	478	229 1	173	203	478	229	173	203	478	229	173

¹⁾ Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors
2) See Table 1.9 for specific reference categories
3) Model includes all predictors. Non significant effects are not presented.
** pc. 0.5
** pc. 0.1
*** pc. 0.0.1.

In general, the analysis of values based on the institutional surveys conducted as part of this study shows a close correspondence between institutional personnel and the Portuguese population, as sampled in the European Social Survey. Dominant orientations in both are universalism, loyalty and security, with relatively little interest in wealth accumulation or risk-taking. Institutional personnel are more inclined than the general population to value new experiences and understanding others, and significantly less interested in commanding obedience from others. Some inter-institutional differences are noteworthy, such as the greater conformism and lesser achievement orientation among personnel of the Food and Economic Security Authority, coupled with a more universalistic and benevolent stance. The opposite is the case among the personnel of other organizations; particularly the energy company and the postal system where less benevolent, more achievement-oriented and hedonistic value orientations are prevalent. These differences could not be anticipated prior to the study and add valuable information to the predictable effects of age, length of employment, and differences in occupational status. These effects conform, by and large, with those anticipated by the relevant literature; inter-institutional differences, on the other hand, are unique to this sample of Portuguese institutions.

Chapter 11

Conclusion

Results presented in this report provide a more detailed and nuanced overview of the Portuguese institutional landscape than anything previously available. The methodology of this project has limitations, such as the small number of institutions studied and the limited representativeness of surveys of their personnel. Despite this, the information gathered is more detailed and reliable than that previously available on the operation and quality of the country's private and public entities.

Despite the originally positive and benign conclusions derived from the qualitative studies, it has become clear that the situation is more complex. In contrast with the universal evaluations of all organizations studied as "institutionally adequate" and their near-universal endorsements as "developmental", the analyses of fuzzy-set scores and of the four surveys suggest a more skeptical stance. The near absence of meritocracy – evident in the qualitative reports and rankings and confirmed by survey results – is a first major concern.

While members of the research team, perhaps reflecting general values in Portuguese society, tend to adopt a tolerant attitude toward still dominant patrimonial and personalistic practices in several institutions, responses by surveyed personnel are more scathing in their negative evaluations on this dimension. It should also be kept in mind, that these practices are severely condemned and penalized in other advanced countries with which Portugal compares itself. While the absence of comparable data from these countries makes any kind of conclusion tentative, it is fair to expect that the Dutch public health service, the Swedish tax system, or the Norwegian postal system would present a rather different institutional profile.

On the positive side, Portuguese institutions are unanimously open to technological innovation and keen on adopting the latest practices. This orientation is key to allowing them to fulfill their institutional blueprints, according to institutional reports. Despite their internal shortcomings, most agencies are also portrayed as strongly proactive toward their users and major clients. It is this openness toward the outside that earned them the designation of "developmental" in most qualitative reports. The profile of Portuguese institutions is not too different from that of advanced Latin American countries,

such as Chile and Mexico, as described in past studies. In these countries as well, technological flexibility and proactivity toward outside actors are also key factors in the proper functioning of private and public agencies (Portes 2009; Portes and Smith 2012). The only major difference is that, in Latin America, proactivity must be paired with at least one internal predictor (meritocracy or absence of internal islands of power) to produce a developmental institution, while in Portugal this requirement is waived.

Lastly, there are also major differences among the organizations studied. Despite some qualifications and shortcomings, the two private institutions, particularly the EDP, come clearly on top in terms of overall quality. They are followed, in the public realm, by ASAE. The public health service, represented by the Santa Maria Hospital, is the weakest of the lot. There are also similarities in this ranking with tendencies detected in the prior study of Latin American institutions. There too, stock exchanges came out consistently on top, followed by tax authorities. The relative absence of proactivity in the Portuguese tax agency fails to reproduce this finding, but, in both studies, institutions that operate in the economic realm are ranked consistently as superior, while those whose mission is to serve the general public - the public health service and the postal system, in particular - emerge as the weakest. The fact that the two private organizations, EDP and Lisbon Euronext, are ranked highest in terms of determinants of institutional quality may provide grist-for-the-mill for advocates of wholesale privatization. On this count, it would be prudent to observe that some public entities are more "privatizable" than others. It is one thing to move the energy company or the national airline into the market and quite another to do so with the public health service or the postal system. Attempts to privatize them in other countries have yielded mixed results (Diaz 2009; Rodriguez Garavito 2012; Wormald and Brieba 2012). The recent privatization of CTT-Correios and the apparent conversion of ASAE from a regulatory to an "advisory" agency in Portugal provide a new opportunity to see how the unshakeable neoliberal faith in markets turns out in reality.

The analysis of value orientations in the five institutional surveys yielded several noteworthy findings. First, the latent factor structure underlying the data fits closely with patterns found in most other countries – from Northern Europe to the Middle East. In this sense, the value scheme presented in Figure 4 corresponds rather well with Portuguese results. Second, the pattern of responses in the various value-dimensions reveals certain significant differences between surveyed institutional personnel and the general Portuguese public, as portrayed in prior studies. The latter appears more traditional, security-oriented and relatively risk averse. On the positive side, both Portuguese surveys portray

a strong endorsement of equality values (Universalism) as well as a generally benevolent orientation toward others.

Determinants of these values again fit well with prior theoretical expectations. Age and long years of service in the same organization lead to a decline in risk-taking and a quest for achievement, and a stronger emphasis on security and the preservation of traditional values. On the positive side, senior management counteract these tendencies with stronger ambition and a greater search for novelty and risk-taking. While such values decline with age, older people appear to be also more interested in fairness and the welfare of others. Significantly, males appear more risk-averse, traditional, and less hedonistic than females, a result not reported elsewhere and worth additional investigation.

Inter-institutional differences include several significant results. The single police agency included in the sample - ASAE - is characterized by a lower achievement orientation and a stronger emphasis on conformity to authority and the defense of tradition among its personnel. On the other hand, employees and managers of the energy company – EDP – are more achievement and power oriented, and keen on the search for new experiences. Similarly, the small number of people employed at the Stock Exchange are noteworthy for their extraordinary endorsement of items tapping risk-taking and stimulation. In the absence of comparable studies in other European countries, it is difficult to situate key findings from this study in the context of developed nations. We have noted the general similarities in determinants of institutional quality between the selected organizations and a prior sample of similar ones in five Latin American countries. The stronger emphasis in Portugal on external determinants, primarily proactivity and technological flexibility, to the neglect of internal criteria reflecting institutional "Weberianness" is worth further attention.

We may conclude by hypothesizing that this common tolerance to the lack of meritocracy and the presence of self-serving cliques within organizations in the Iberian countries (both Portugal and Latin America) is at variance with the emphasis placed on these criteria by public and private agencies in Northern European and North American countries. In the latter, violation of meritocratic rules and the presence of self-serving internal cliques appear to be met with stronger disapproval. That these institutional weaknesses are less common elsewhere in the developed world is adumbrated by their relative absence in the EDP and Lisbon Euronext, precisely the two organizations subjected to strong external monitoring and international regulation. The extent to which this hypothesis and parallel ones hold when comparing Portugal with other developed countries is a question for further investigation.

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Appendix A

Institutional Survey Questionnaire (Questionário às Instituições)

2012

A Universidade Nova de Lisboa e a Universidade de Princeton têm em curso um estudo comparativo de instituições públicas e privadas no que respeita às características, crenças e orientações dos seus colaboradores. O estudo visa uma avaliação da governança institucional em Portugal e dos meios para a aperfeiçoar, procurando ainda explorar as perspectivas de quem dirige e trabalha nessas organizações. A informação recolhida no estudo será exclusivamente usada para fins científicos. Os resultados poderão ajudar a guiar as políticas públicas com vista a aperfeiçoar a qualidade da governança em Portugal.

O anonimato da sua participação, voluntária, no estudo será integralmente respeitado. Note que não pretendemos ficar com o registo do seu nome. Isto porque pretendemos obter de si respostas francas e sérias às perguntas. Uma vez concluídos, os questionários serão guardados em armários fechados, no gabinete do projecto, na Universidade Nova de Lisboa, não sendo de nenhum modo acessíveis aos gestores ou à administração da instituição a que pertence. Os resultados que virão a público no fim do estudo serão apresentados sob a forma de dados agregados sobre tendências gerais, sob a forma de tabelas e análises estatísticas.

A sua participação no estudo e a sua resposta franca e séria às perguntas que se seguem tem uma importância crucial para a qualidade dos resultados finais do projecto. Em nome da equipa responsável pela investigação, agradecemos o tempo e a atenção que aceitar dedicar a esta tarefa.

Cidade Cidade Capacita Ca
nais elevado que concluiu? 10 (5.° e 6.° anos) 10 (entre o 7.° e o 9.° anos) Indário (entre o 10.° e o 12.° anos) Prior uperior 1 (nome da organização)?
o (5.° e 6.° anos) o (entre o 7.° e o 9.° anos) ndário (entre o 10.° e o 12.° anos) rior uperior (nome da organização)? a desde que começou a trabalhar no/a (nome da organização
o (entre o 7.° e o 9.° anos) ndário (entre o 10.° e o 12.° anos) rior uperior (nome da organização)? a desde que começou a trabalhar no/a (nome da organização
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– a desde que começou a trabalhar no/a (nome da organização
a desde que começou a trabalhar no/a (nome da organização
2. Uma vez 3. Duas ou três vezes
5. Seis ou mais vezes
s melhor corresponde à ocupação que actualmente tem?
a, trabalhador/a de apoio e manutenção
écnico/a
/secretário/a
ermédia
termédio
/gestor de topo
s corresponde melhor à <i>primeira</i> ocupação que teve no/a (no
a, trabalhador/a de apoio e manutenção
écnico/a
/secretário/a
ermédia
termédio
nistrador/gestor de topo
grau de satisfação com a sua ocupação actual?
2. Satisfeito/a 3. Mais ou menos satisfeit
5. Muito insatisfeito/a

1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda	3. Não concorda nem discorda
		-
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em absoluto	6. Não sabe
ndique por favor se concorda co	om as seguintes afirmações, ou	ı se discorda das mesmas:
2. O/A (nome da organização)	cumpre, de um modo geral, os	propósitos para que foi criado/a.
1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda	3. Não concorda nem discorda
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em absoluto	6. Não sabe
3. O funcionamento adequado	do/a (nome da organização) é	essencial para Portugal.
1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda	3. Não concorda nem discorda
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em absoluto	6. Não sabe
	do/a (nome da organização) e	xecutam as suas tarefas de forma
ompetente. 1. Concorda em absoluto	2 C	a Ni≃d d:d-
	2. Concorda	 Não concorda nem discorda Não sabe
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em absoluto	
		encialmente, das relações pessoais.
1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda	3. Não concorda nem discorda
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em absoluto	6. Não sabe
6. A maioria dos gestores /adm onestas e competentes.	inistradores do/a (nome da org	ganização) é composta por pessoas
1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda	3. Não concorda nem discorda
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em absoluto	6. Não sabe
7. De uma forma geral, o/a (no o uso de novas tecnologias e à		tar actualizado/a no que respeita s.
1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda	3. Não concorda nem discorda
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em absoluto	6. Não sabe
8. O/A (nome da organização) atisfaça os seus utentes/cliente		nce para prestar um serviço que
1. Concorda em absoluto		3. Não concorda nem discorda
	5. Discorda em absoluto	-
	itucional entre a/o (nome da o	rganização) e os decisores de topo
1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda	3. Não concorda nem discorda
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em absoluto	6. Não sabe
e acordo com a sua experiênci		
erdadeiras ou falsas. o. Existem grupos no seio do/a		
róprios, mesmo que estes preju		
1. Verdadeira 2.	Falsa 3. Nem uma	nem outra 4. Não sabe
	4-1-1	:
1. A maioria dos colaboradores	do/a (nome da organização) e	imune ao suborno ou a corrupção

22. Se seguirem as regras e se fiz promovidas no/a (nome da orga		no de modo con	npetente, as pessoa	as são
1. Verdadeira	2. Falsa	3. Nem uma n	em outra	4. Não sabe
23. Os líderes do/a (nome da org interagem com a instituição ou o			o feedback das pess	soas que
1. Verdadeira	2. Falsa	3. Nem uma n	em outra	4. Não sabe
24. De uma forma geral, os colab aperfeiçoar os seus desempenho				permanência
1. Verdadeira	2. Falsa	3. Nem uma n	em outra	4. Não sabe
25. O Luís e o Fernando são fund	cionários do/a (no:	ne da organizaç	ção) há muitos ano:	S.
O Luís diz: □ Esta organizaçã É pouco provável que as roti			o muito específico.	
O Fernando diz: □ Esta orgar no sentido de introduzir mel			as e tenta mudar as	coisas
Quem tem razão?				
1. O Luís	2. O Fernando		3. Nenhum dos	dois
26. A Ana e a Margarida tambén	n trabalham para a	o (nome da org	ganização).	
A Ana diz: □ As mulheres têr são frequentemente preterid			rganização;	
A Margarida diz: □ As mulhe nesta organização; progredir				
Quem tem razão?				
1. A Ana	2. A Margarida	1	3. Nenhuma da:	s duas
27. A Aline e o Milton são iguals	mente trabalhador	es da/o (nome o	la organização).	
A Aline diz: □ Dificilmente co com a minha área de formaçã	•	funções nesta c	rganização compat	íveis
O Milton diz: ☐ As pessoas, i forma nesta organização. ☐ Quem tem razão?	ndependentement	e da cor da pele	, são tratadas da mo	esma
1. A Aline	2. O Milton		3. Nenhum dos	dois
Diga, por favor, se concorda con	n as seguintes afirn	nações:		
28. A maioria dos responsáveis r das pessoas comuns.	•	-	teressa pelos probl	emas
1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda		3. Não concorda ne	em discorda
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em a	absoluto	6. Não sabe	
29. Nos dias que correm, não sal				
1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda	quem pouemos	3. Não concorda ne	am discorda
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em a	absoluto	6. Não sabe	eni discorda
·	-			
30. A maior parte das pessoas nã		tece ao seu prò		
1. Concorda em absoluto	2. Concorda		3. Não concorda ne	em discorda
4. Discorda	5. Discorda em a	absoluto	6. Não sabe	
Finalmente, algumas perguntas s				
Vou descrever-lhe pessoas co medida cada uma dessas pess			pedir-lhe que me d	iga em que

31. Um/a homem. Gosta de fazer as			er novas ideias e	e ser criativo/a.	
1. Exactament como eu	re 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
32. Um/a homem. Quer ter muito di			e ser rico/a.		
1. Exactament como eu	te 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
33. Um/a homema igualmente. Acred					sejam tratadas
1. Exactament como eu	te 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
34. Um/a homem. Quer que as pesso			cia a poder mos	trar as suas cap	acidades.
1. Exactament como eu	te 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
35. Um/a homem. Evita tudo o que				sítio onde se sir	nta seguro/a.
1. Exactament como eu	re 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
36. Um/a homem. para fazer. Acha c					sas novas
1. Exactament como eu	te 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
37. Um/a homem. Acha que as pesso					
1. Exactament como eu	re 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
38. Um/a homem Mesmo quando d		•	•		
1. Exactament como eu	e 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo

39. Um/a homem/ Tenta não chamar		•	e ser humilde e	modesto/a.	
1. Exactament como eu	e 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
40. Um/a homem/ Gosta de tratar be		em é important	e passar bons m	omentos.	
1. Exactament como eu	e 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
41. Um/a homem/ faz. Gosta de ser li				próprias decisõ	es sobre o que
1. Exactament como eu	e 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
42. Um/a homem/ Preocupa-se com			e ajudar os que	o/a rodeiam.	
1. Exactament como eu	e 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
43. Um/a homem/ Gosta de receber o			e ter sucesso.		
1. Exactament como eu	e 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
44. Um/a homem/ todas as ameaças.					
1. Exactament como eu	e 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
45. Um/a homem/ Quer ter uma vida		cura a aventura	e gosta de corr	er riscos.	
1. Exactament como eu	e 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo
46. Um/a homem/ Evita fazer coisas		•	•	pre como deve :	ser.
1. Exactament como eu	e 2. Muito parecido comigo	3. Parecido comigo	4. Um bocadinho parecido comigo	5. Nada parecido comigo	6. Não tem nada a ver comigo

47. Um/a homem/mulher para quem é importante que os outros lhe tenham respeito. Quer que as pessoas façam o que ele/ela diz. 5. Nada 1. Exactamente 2. Muito 3. Parecido 4. Um 6. Não tem parecido como eu comigo bocadinho parecido nada a ver comigo parecido comigo comigo comigo 48. Um/a homem/mulher para quem é importante ser leal com os amigos. Dedica-se às pessoas que lhe são próximas. 1. Exactamente 2. Muito 3. Parecido 4. Um 5. Nada 6. Não tem como eu parecido bocadinho parecido nada a ver comigo comigo parecido comigo comigo comigo 49. Um/a homem/mulher que acredita seriamente que as pessoas devem proteger a natureza. Proteger o ambiente é importante para ele/ela. 6. Não tem 1. Exactamente 2. Muito 3. Parecido 4. Um 5. Nada nada a ver como eu parecido comigo bocadinho parecido comigo parecido comigo comigo comigo 50. Um/a homem/mulher que dá importância à tradição. Faz tudo o que pode para agir de acordo com a sua religião e a sua família. 3. Parecido 6. Não tem 1. Exactamente 2. Muito 4. Um 5. Nada nada a ver como eu parecido comigo bocadinho parecido comigo parecido comigo comigo comigo 51. Um/a homem/mulher que procura aproveitar todas as oportunidades para se divertir. É importante para ele/ela fazer coisas que lhe dão prazer. 5. Nada 1. Exactamente 2. Muito 3. Parecido 4. Um 6. Não tem como eu parecido comigo bocadinho parecido nada a ver comigo parecido comigo comigo comigo Obrigado pela sua colaboração!

Appendix B

Steps and Results of the Five Institutional Surveys

Cármen Maciel

Inquérito por questionário

	ASAE		Bolsa	СТТ	EDP	HSM
Período em que decorreu o inquérito	De 04 a 18 Mar de 2013	rço	De 11 de Junho a 01 de Outubro de 2013	De 18 de Setembro a 31 de Outubro de 2013	De 21 de Março a 24 de Abril de 2013	De 01 de Agosto a 08 de Outubro de 2013
Contacto dentro da instituição	Maria Natércia Sousa; Chefe di divisão do Gabi de Planeamento Estratégico, Qu e Auditoria (GP Inspectora de c	e nete o alidade PEQA);	Paulo Pina Pires; Manager EWC Relations & HR Director Portugal Global Human Resources	Luís Paulo ; Diretor de Qualidade e Sustentabilidade dos CTT.	Inês Ferreira Nunes ; Técnica do Departamento de Recursos Humanos.	Carlos Manuel Morais da Costa; Membro do Conselho de Administração do Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE. Professor da Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública – UNL
,	O questionário disponibilizado todos* os func das diversas Ur Orgânicas da A acordo com o sesquema: UO Coimbra Castelo B. Mirandela Porto Faro Sede (DAPI) Sede (UNO) Santarém Lisboa Évora Sede (UCIF) * Nota: Uma vez qu Administradores tir entrevistados pesses pelo membro da eq projecto (Mário Co a Direcção decidiu do inquérito por qua plicando o inquéri a partir dos Dirigen Intermédios, abrang todas as demais cat ocupacionais da AS Assistentes Operac	online a ionários nidades SAE, de seguinte Data de respo 04 /03 04 /03 05/03 05/03 05/03 11/03 11 /03 11 /03 12 e 13/ e os sham sido salmente uipe de ntumélias), excluí-los sestionário, to apenas tes gendo egorias AE, até aos	todos os funcionários da Sede em Lisboa.	Segundo a Administração da Empresa, é a seguinte a distribuição dos grupos ocupacionais da instituição: • Quadros: 10% • Carteiros: 60% • Tratamento de correio: 10% • Rede de Lojas: 20% Excepto a categoria "Quadros" – concentrada na sede em Lisboa – , todos os demais grupos ocupacionais estão distribuídos pelo território nacional. Em virtude da dificuldade esperada de acesso de algumas ocupações à internet (carteiros, etc.), a Administração dos CTT pediu que o inquérito fosse parcialmente distribuído em papel, para além da plataforma online. A administração estabeleceu contacto com os serviços operacionais e os serviços centrais, informando sobre a feitura do inquérito e apelando à participação de todas as categorias ocupacionais no mesmo.	Administração da Empresa. De acordo com critérios de representatividade estatística de cada um dos grupos ocupacionais da EDP Distribuição, foram	O questionário foi disponibilizado online a todos os funcionários do Hospital de Santa Maria, em Lisboa.

	ASAE	Bolsa	СТТ	EDP	HSM
Qual a percentagem de respostas recebidas (ou, em alternativa, qual a percentagem de não-resposta) - em relação à amostra potencial definida acima	256 respostas obtidas num universo de 294 (que corresponde ao total de funcionários da ASAE) Taxa de resposta: 87% do total de funcionários.	12 respostas obtidas num universo de 26 (que corresponde ao total de funcionários da Bolsa em Lisboa) Taxa de resposta: 46% do total de funcionários.	Estes contactos foram	288 respostas obtidas num total de 300 contactos directos. Estes contactos foram estabelecidos pela administração da EDP Distribuição. (Em 2012, a EDP Distribuição tinha cerca de 3500 trabalhadores; a EDP Grupo, mais de 12 mil.) Taxa de resposta: 96% da amostra seleccionada; esta correspondeu por sua vez a 8,6% da população ao serviço da EDP Distribuição.	231 respostas obtidas num universo de 6.400 funcionários (que corresponde ao total de funcionários do HST) Taxa de resposta: 3,6% do total de funcionários.
Qual a per- centagem de respos- tas rece- bida via plataforma online, por correio electrónico ou em su- porte papel em cada instituição	100% de respostas (256) obtidas através da plataforma <i>online</i> .	100% de respostas (12) obtidas através da plataforma <i>online</i> .	70% de respostas (392) obtidas através de RSF; 30% (167) de respostas obtidas através da plataforma <i>online</i> .	100% de respostas (288) obtidas através da plataforma <i>online</i> .	100% de respostas (231) obtidas através da plataforma <i>online</i> .

 ASAE	Bolsa	СТТ	EDP	HSM
 O link do questionário foi enviado pela Administração da empresa a todos os funcionários através de mensagem de email (o questionário estava disponível numa plataforma online). Todos os funcionários das Unidades Orgânicas receberam esse email da Administração, e, tendo um dia específico para responderem, foram localmente incentivados a colaborar. Houve uma monitorização diária do número de respostas a fim de saber se havia necessidade de reforço no pedido de colaboração. A pessoa de contacto facilitou muito todo o processo – que foi célere e eficaz.	de mensagem de email (o questionário estava disponível numa plataforma online). Houve uma monitorização do processo, ao longo das semanas, mas nem sempre foi fácil obter feedback quanto à possibilidade de	A administração dos CTT optou por aplicar o questionário através de duas formas: 1. «Os questionários em papel foram já enviados para a rede operacional [dos CTT] e [abrangem] uma amostra de cerca de 1000 trabalhadores, segmentados por 40 unidades operacionais (Centros de Distribuição, Lojas e um Centro de Operações). Instruímos as chefías no sentido de entregarem os inquéritos às equipas a partir de 30 de Setembro, motivando-as para a participação, com prazo limite de resposta de uma semana (envelope RSF enviado diretamente pelo trabalhador, por correio).» 2. «Quanto aos questionários online estarão igualmente disponíveis aos trabalhadores dos serviços centrais aproximadamente nessa altura, precedidos do envio de uma mensagem de apelo à participação.» A direcção da empresa enviou uma mensagem de email a 300 funcionários dos serviços centrais. Os questionários preenchidos em papel foram remetidos via RSF para o Gabinete do projecto. Houve uma monitorização semanal do número de respostas a fim de saber se havia necessidade de reforço no pedido de colaboração. O processo foi moroso por causa de indisponibilidades institucionais e pela burocracia exigida para tratar das RSF.		empresa a todos os funcionários através de mensagem de <i>email</i> (o questionário estava disponível numa plataforma <i>online</i>).

Appendix C

Summary Statistics of Value Dimensions by Institution

Summary Statistics of Ten Values

	Full S	Sample	AS	SAE	c	TT	E	DP	н	SM	L	SE
Value	Mean	Std. Dev.										
Power	-1.387	0.750	-1.463	0.780	-1.410	0.783	-1.277	0.671	-1.378	0.720	-1.491	0.696
Achievement	-0.184	0.837	-0.402	0.860	-0.190	0.853	-0.017	0.793	-0.132	0.768	-0.264	0.875
Hedonism	0.174	0.719	0.007	0.736	0.269	0.697	0.171	0.728	0.124	0.720	0.0996	0.554
Stimulation	0.539	0.825	-0.392	0.818	-0.567	0.856	-0.487	0.7469	-0.741	0.807	0.100	0.634
Self-Direction	0.038	0.718	0.055	0.715	0.007	0.724	0.057	0.685	0.063	0.752	0.236	0.637
Universalism	0.734	0.558	0.825	0.601	0.663	0.552	0.714	0.513	0.827	0.558	1.009	0.448
Benevolence	0.884	0.573	0.989	0.624	0.834	0.553	0.771	0.539	1.045	0.564	0.827	0.441
Tradition	-0.021	0.765	0.101	0.705	-0.010	0.777	-0.043	0.784	-0.169	0.748	0.145	o.868
Conformity	-0.210	0.876	-0.207	0.870	-0.137	0.883	-0.309	0.848	-0.259	0.900	-0.446	0.701
Security	0.144	0.770	0.076	0.726	0.210	0.767	0.061	0.792	0.206	0.757	-0.719	0.858

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Mário Contumélias (Autoridade de Segurança Alimentar e Económica)
Miguel de Pompeia (NYSE Euronext-Lisboa)
Carmen Maciel (Institutional Survey Coordinator)



This study aimed at gaining a greater understanding of the character, quality, and contributions to national development of Portuguese institutions through an intensive study of six national organizations deemed emblematic of those in their respective areas of activity. The study drew on a prior analysis of twenty-three Latin American institutions in five countries employing a similar methodology to facilitate cross-national comparisons. Results are presented in six qualitative ethnographies of the target organizations, plus tables of scores on six key hypothesized determinants of institutional quality and contributions to development: meritocracy, immunity to corruption, absence of islands of power, proactivity toward their environment, technological openness and flexibility, and presence of external allies.

Overall, Portuguese institutions are defined as capable of fulfilling the goals for which they were created and making significant contributions to the country's socio-economic development. There are, however, major limitations that qualify this conclusion and significant differences among the institutions. Meritocracy is lacking in most of them and there is a bothersome presence of internal cliques ("islands of power"). While major instances of corruption appear to be a thing of the past, numerous instances of patrimonial and personalistic practices in several of these organizations were identified.

The institutional ethnographies were supplemented by surveys of each organization's personnel designed to check on the validity of the qualitative ethnographies and expand their scope. Surveys were conducted on an anonymous basis to insure the validity of responses. Respondents confirmed the institutional weaknesses observed by the team of investigators, as well as the relative superiority of private institutions in the economic field over public ones rendering services to the general population.

The surveys also contained a battery of value items replicating those used in the European Social Survey (ESS). Results were systematically compared among personnel of the six institutions, as well as with those reported by ESS for the general Portuguese population. There are some notable discrepancies between both, with institutional personnel reporting less interest in personal power and traditional values and the general public endorsing both tradition and security over risk-taking. For the most part, however, there is a similar pattern for both samples on most of the ten value dimensions examined.

Implications of findings from the diverse parts of the study for theories of development in economics and sociology and for future institutional policies are discussed.

