



# LANDING THE BLAME: OVERFISHING IN THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC 2019

WHICH MEMBER STATES ARE SETTING QUOTAS  
ABOVE SCIENTIFIC ADVICE?

UNCOVERING THE  
EU MEMBER STATES  
MOST RESPONSIBLE  
FOR SETTING FISHING  
QUOTAS ABOVE  
SCIENTIFIC ADVICE

*Fisheries ministers are risking the sustainability of fish stocks by consistently setting fishing limits above scientific advice. This is our fifth year running a series of briefings to identify which Member States are standing in the way of more fish, more profits, and more jobs for European citizens.*

Food for an additional 89 million EU citizens. An extra €1.6 billion in annual revenue. Over 20,000 new jobs across the continent. Far from being a pipe dream, all of this could be a reality, if we paid more attention to one of Europe's most significant natural resources – our seas.<sup>1</sup> If EU waters were properly managed – with damaged fish stocks rebuilt above levels that could support their maximum sustainable yield (MSY) – we could enjoy their full potential within a generation.<sup>2</sup>

## **FISHING LIMITS VS SCIENTIFIC ADVICE**

Every year, fisheries ministers have an opportunity to make this a reality when they agree on a total allowable catch (TAC) for commercial fish stocks. Scientific bodies, predominantly

the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), provide information about the state of most stocks and recommend maximum catch levels.<sup>3</sup> Yet overfishing continues as this scientific advice goes unheeded.

Our historical analysis of agreed TACs for EU waters between 2001 and 2018 shows that, on average, two-thirds of TACs were set above scientific advice. While the percentage by which TACs were set above advice declined throughout this period (from 42% to 8% in all EU waters), the proportion of TACs set above advice did not.<sup>4</sup>

The reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that entered into force in 2014 aims to restore and maintain populations of fish stocks above levels capable of supporting MSY. The corresponding exploitation rate was to be achieved by 2015 where possible and by 2020 at the latest for all stocks.<sup>5</sup> Following scientific advice is essential if we are to achieve this goal, end overfishing, and restore fish stocks to healthy levels.

### AGREEMENTS BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

The negotiations over TACs are held by the Agriculture and Fisheries configuration of the EU Council of Ministers. These negotiations are not public, only their outcomes are. This lack of transparency means that ministers are not on the hook when they ignore scientific advice and give priority to short-term interests that risk the health of fish stocks. This briefing, a continuation of the *Landing the Blame* series, reveals which Member States and ministers are behind decisions that go against the EU's long-term interests. This conclusion is reached by analysing the outcomes of the negotiations and calculating which Member States end up with TACs above scientific advice. The key assumption is that these

Member States are the main drivers of overfishing, either because they have been actively pushing for fishing limits to be set above scientific advice, or they have failed to prevent such limits being put in place. A Freedom of Information Request revealed that the results of the *Landing the Blame* series closely corresponded with the Member States' positions heading into the Council negotiations.<sup>6</sup> The results also align with the public positions on particular TACs announced by Member States in the lead up to the negotiations.<sup>7</sup>

### THE 2019 NORTHEAST ATLANTIC TACS

During the December 2018 negotiations, ministers set the TACs for the majority of commercial EU fish species for 2019 – a critical moment with significant implications for the livelihoods of European fishers and the sustainable management of the natural resource. This analysis covers 120 TAC decisions made (or confirmed) at this meeting. It shows that where comparable scientific advice was available, 55 TACs were set above advice, amounting to 312,000 tonnes of excess TAC. This is continuing the trend of permitting overfishing in EU waters with northeast Atlantic TACs set 16% above scientific advice on average – a big increase from the 2018 TACs (9%). The earlier negotiations for the 2019 Baltic and deep sea TACs were also set above scientific advice, with five out of 10 and eight out of 12 TACs exceeding advice, respectively.<sup>8,9</sup>


For the 2019 northeast Atlantic TACs, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Ireland top the league table of Member States with the highest percentage of their TAC in excess of scientific advice (Table 1). These Member States were involved with TAC decisions that allow fishing at 52%, 24%, and 22%, respectively, above scientific advice.

TABLE 1. THE OVERFISHING LEAGUE TABLE.

MEMBER STATE	MINISTER/ REPRESENTATIVE	EXCESS TAC (%)	EXCESS TAC (TONNES)
Sweden	Sven-Erik Bucht	52.4%	17,369
United Kingdom	John Gardiner	24.3%	106,925
Ireland	Michael Creed	21.7%	34,052
Denmark	Eva Kjer Hansen	19.7%	49,914
Germany	Hermann Onko Aeikens	18.0%	20,620
Netherlands	Carola Schouten	13.5%	31,910
Belgium	Joke Schauvliege	10.4%	3,009
France	Didier Guillaume	9.4%	27,230
Spain	Luis Planas Puchades	6.6%	16,689
Portugal	Ana Paula Vitorino	3.8%	3,662

Note: Member States with fewer than five comparable TACs have been excluded, in order not to overattribute the results from a small number of decisions for a minor party.

FIGURE 1. EXCESS TAC BY EU MEMBER STATE.



The UK, Denmark, and Ireland are the worst offenders in terms of the total tonnage of TAC set above advice. Ministers representing these Member States have received the largest TAC increases above scientific advice in terms of tonnes and are therefore the most responsible for impeding the transition to sustainable fisheries in the EU.

Table 1 allocates the excess TAC to each Member State and minister/representative present during the TAC negotiations.<sup>10</sup> Sweden tops the league table with 17,369 tonnes of quota above scientific advice – equal to 52%. This is largely due to herring, whiting, mackerel, and blue ling in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. Sweden did

not top the league table for the 2018 northeast Atlantic TACs, which was led by Ireland and the United Kingdom.<sup>11</sup> As the mackerel TAC was set twice as high as scientific advice, the Marine Stewardship Council announced that the mackerel fishery will be losing the blue tick eco-label.<sup>12</sup>

Analysing ICES advice and excess TAC by Member State illustrates that excess TAC is not just a function of the total amount of fishing a Member State carries out (Figure 1). If that were the case, then each Member State’s excess total TAC would be proportional to its total advice. Instead, we see a spectrum of excess TAC percentages, with some Member States frequently towards the top or bottom of these annual calculations. Although this does not prove in itself that the worst offending Member States are pushing for higher TACs (that would require greater transparency around the negotiations), it is consistent with this thesis.


## 2019 IN CONTEXT

The percentage of excess TAC set during the northeast Atlantic negotiations rose in 2019 (Figure 2), also pushing up the excess TACs for all regions combined. The high correlation between the northeast Atlantic and overall TACs stems from the high number of TACs set for the northeast Atlantic region. This shows that ensuring sustainability in northeast Atlantic fisheries is paramount to ending overfishing in the EU overall.


The number of TACs above advice across all regions declined in the setting of 2019’s TACs but remains alarmingly high at 55 out of 120, or 46% (Figure 3). To fulfil the CFP’s objectives, excess TACs must decline to zero by 2020, but this is unlikely to happen given the small progress made year-on-year until now.

The full ICES and Council dataset used for the analysis in this briefing is available online on the New Economics Foundation website for download and further analysis.<sup>13</sup>

FIGURE 2. EXCESS TAC 2001–2019.



**FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF TACS ABOVE ICES ADVICE.**



## DISCUSSION


The 2019 results show insufficient progress towards fishing in line with scientific advice. As long as ministers delay bringing fishing rates to sustainable levels, stocks will not deliver optimally, costing revenue and jobs in the long run. There are several issues related to the northeast Atlantic TAC negotiations that are worth describing in detail.

### MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS

Historically, fishing ministers have emerged from these quota negotiations declaring victory for their fishing fleets after securing fishing quotas above scientific advice. Recently the tone of these statements has shifted as the pressure to act sustainably has mounted. Now ministers attempt to present the view that they have been victorious for their national fishing fleet, but also that scientific advice has also been ‘respected’, even if it was not followed.

Irish fishing minister Michael Creed explained his position in the negotiations by emphasising the importance of the fishing industry: “I’m really conscious about and in particular securing an outcome that is sustainable from the point of view of the fishing industry in those coastal communities.”<sup>14</sup> Despite meeting with multiple stakeholders, the minister was remarkably candid saying that “as always, industry representatives, in particular, Sean O’Donoghue of the Killybegs Fishermen’s Organisation, were extremely helpful to the Irish negotiating team.”<sup>15</sup> In turn, Sean O’Donoghue described the quotas secured for Ireland as “very significant wins” and praised “the role and commitment of Minister Creed and his officials in working closely with us”.<sup>16</sup>

The Scottish government’s Cabinet Secretary for the Rural Economy, Fergus Ewing spoke of “very challenging scientific advice” but that in his respective role in the negotiations

**FIGURE 4. EXCESS TAC BY NEGOTIATION.**

he “successfully resisted proposals that would have severely limited the availability of cod and whiting quota and risked throttling catches of other valuable species”. In his view, “the outcomes secured respect the scientific advice and strike the best balance between opportunities for the fleet and ensuring sustainable fishing levels.”<sup>17</sup>

#### **Socio-economic factors**

That TACs should be set in line with scientific advice is clear from the text of the CFP. Article 2 states that “the maximum sustainable yield exploitation rate shall be achieved by 2015 where possible and, on a progressive and incremental basis at the least by 2020 for all stocks.”<sup>18</sup> Delays to achieving MSY past 2015 should only be allowed “if achieving the exploitation rates by 2015 would seriously jeopardise the social and economic sustainability of the fishing fleets involved” (Recital 7).<sup>19</sup>

While the scope of the analysis conducted here is to find where scientific advice has not been followed, there is the possibility that some of these increases can be justified for

socio-economic reasons. To date however, the Council has produced no documentation of socio-economic necessity in support of their decisions, and the 2019 northeast Atlantic TACs were no exception.

Some Member States have sought to provide socio-economic evidence, but what has been produced (at least publicly) is a simple multiplication of that change in TAC by the price of the catch.<sup>20</sup> This form of analysis is not only simplistic but extremely one-sided. By definition, a higher TAC will always be the optimal outcome. A policy that is designated to remove fish stocks needs to be evaluated over a multi-year time period. It should also take into account the current financial performance of fleets (i.e., viability analysis).

Studies of fish stock recovery pathways show that the faster the transition to sustainable fishing the better, as the net present value is higher the greater the number of years producing MSY.<sup>21,22</sup> Greater benefits have also been found from fishing in the lower end of MSY ranges compared to the upper end.<sup>23,24,25</sup>



### **Troubling TACs set with third countries**

Several important TACs are negotiated with third countries through bilateral negotiations with Norway and coastal states negotiations.\* The outcomes of these negotiations were confirmed at the December Council.

Due in part to the structure of these negotiations where there is a constant threat of parties leaving the negotiating table and setting a unilateral TAC, these negotiations have a history of departing from scientific advice by a significant margin. This divergence continued for the 2019 TACs with 32% excess TAC for those set in the coastal states agreement and 22% excess TAC for those set in the Norway agreement, compared to 6% excess TAC for those set exclusively by the EU Council of Ministers (a difference of 26 and 16 percentage points).

The pressure to reach an agreement between coastal states at any cost is evident from the statements of those close to the process. Audun Maråk, the director of Norway's industry association Fiskebåt, explained: "We are pleased that an agreement has been reached, even if the agreement in practice is not followed."<sup>26</sup> Unfortunately, from a sustainability perspective, there is no reason to be pleased. Instead, it goes to show that decisions about common pool resources are best made collaboratively in a common legal framework.

The prospect of the UK becoming an independent coastal state with the ability to set unilateral TACs is therefore a serious challenge to the setting of TACs – for all parties cumulatively – in line with scientific advice.<sup>27</sup>

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\* The other states in the coastal state negotiations are Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and Russia in addition to Norway.

This is made even more alarming by statements from UK politicians about increasing the UK's share of TACs while the EU is resolute about not decreasing its own share.

### **Limits vs catches**

It should be noted that the amount of fish caught is rarely the entirety of the agreed quota. For economic and biological reasons, fishing may fall under the quota whereas illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing may push fishing pressure above the agreed limit. Rather than analysing fishing pressure, this series of briefings specifically analyses the policy intent of the Council of Ministers.

### **A lack of transparency in Council meetings**

Under Article 3 of the reformed CFP, 'transparency' is mentioned as one of the CFP's principles of good governance, yet the secretive negotiations undermine this principle and make the process less open to scrutiny. This study is therefore also limited in what it can achieve, as data shortages prevent a comprehensive analysis. Member States that top the league table for excess TAC should therefore be major advocates of increased transparency, if judging performance by outcomes is insufficient.

A 2017 investigation by Corporate Europe Observatory revealed some that fishing industry lobbyists have used press passes to access the EU Council building during crucial ministerial negotiations on fishing quotas.<sup>28</sup> Perhaps not surprisingly, the fishing industry lobbyists were representing fleets from Member States near the top of the *Landing the Blame* league table for the northeast Atlantic TACs (Spain and the Netherlands).<sup>29</sup>

### **A lack of transparency in TAC determination from ICES advice**

Mirroring the difficulties with transparency around the Council negotiations is the issue of how the TACs were determined. Ideally, this exercise of comparing ICES advice and TACs should be a straightforward process that can be easily scrutinised. This is possible with the right request to ICES, but is currently far from what is practised.

Data on international TAC agreements are difficult to find, making it hard to properly apportion responsibility for overfishing. As a result, TACs had to be assembled from press releases after the negotiations concluded, but a more official and finalised source would aid this important analysis. Moreover, mismatches between the EU's reported TACs and reported bilateral agreements published on the Commission's online page can make it difficult to establish exact quotas.<sup>30,31</sup> Using data compiled from *Landing the Blame: Overfishing in EU Waters 2001–2015*, the third country share of TACs was calculated by taking an average of the difference between total TAC and EU TAC in years where both were reported.

Matching ICES and TAC zones is also a perennial issue that could and should be resolved.<sup>32</sup>

All of these required inputs for determining TACs from ICES advice should be made publicly available in the interests of transparency and access to information by any stakeholder. This is the only way for civil society to properly hold representatives to account.

### **The landing obligation**

Since 1 January 2019, the landing obligation has come into full force. It requires fishing vessels to land all their catch in an effort to reduce waste and

unaccounted fishing mortality. This year, for the first time, we therefore compare ICES advice on catch limits with the TAC that has been set; previously, the ICES advice on landings was compared with TAC before top-ups were added. Note that some vessels under the landing obligation continue to be given exemptions that allow them to discard given quantities of fish, if it is not feasible to reduce discards or when discarded fish are likely to survive (so-called *de minimis* exemptions).<sup>33</sup> A lack of transparency in how the exemptions were calculated prevents an adjustment to ICES advice to account for fishing mortality under these exemptions, meaning the results presented here will in some cases underestimate the amount of excess TAC.

### **OFFTRACK FOR 2020**

Article 2.2 of the CFP calls for fish stocks to be rebuilt to levels that can support the MSY "by 2015 where possible and, on a progressive, incremental basis at the latest by 2020 for all stocks". With the 2020 deadline fast approaching, EU fisheries are not on track, with calculations showing that at the current rate it will take until 2034 to meet the sustainability policy objective.<sup>34</sup>

No impact assessments have been published by the European Commission or other actors to justify this delay. The only socio-economic evidence that has been published is from Member States on the impact of the Commission's TAC proposal. This evidence is not only methodologically weak in terms of omitting quota uptake and price elasticities, it is also focused on the economic impact for only one year – entirely missing the purpose of TACs as a tool for stock recovery over multiple years.<sup>35</sup> This is crucially important, as a study in the *Journal of*



*Marine Policy* found that the earlier the transition to sustainable fisheries in the northeast Atlantic, the larger the net benefits (as measured in net present value)<sup>36</sup> – a result that has also been found for US fisheries.<sup>37</sup>

The consequence of this delay is that later this year there will be a need for large TAC reductions across many species, with potentially large socio-economic consequences. At this point it will be clear that more effort to restore fish stocks should have been made earlier – especially during the current period where overall fleet profits are high due to low oil prices and an increasing abundance of some fish stocks.

While there are voices calling for the deadline to simply be postponed beyond 2020, this constitutes bad environmental policy with adverse economic effects and a risk to the credibility of EU policy in fisheries and beyond.<sup>38</sup> For the future of sustainable fisheries and the meaning of EU policy, there is a lot at stake.

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## ANNEX

## ATLANTIC TACS COMPARED TO SCIENTIFIC ADVICE (TONNES)

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	The Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Anchovy	8	33,000	33,000	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Anglerfish	Norwegian waters of 4	1,613	1,700	87	5.4%	3	66	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	16
Anglerfish	7	32,737	32,999	262	0.8%	24	0	155	3	20	3	0	10	0	47
Anglerfish	Union waters of 2a and 4	19,207	20,237	1,030	5.4%	36	80	7	39	0	28	0	0	1	838
Anglerfish	6; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 12 and 14	10,870	11,453	583	5.4%	21	0	258	24	58	20	0	22	0	179
Anglerfish	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	8,305	8,371	66	0.8%	0	0	56	0	0	0	0	10	0	0
Anglerfish	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.11	4,215	4,166	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greater silver smelt	Union and international waters of 1 and 2	67	90	23	34.1%	0	0	2	6	0	5	0	0	0	10
Greater silver smelt	Union waters of 3a and 4	920	1,234	314	34.1%	0	278	2	3	2	13	0	0	11	5
Greater silver smelt	Union and international waters of 5, 6 and 7	4,142	4,661	519	12.5%	0	0	1	40	37	413	0	0	0	29
Blue ling	Union and international waters of 3a	0	8	8		0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	0
Blue ling	International waters of 12	0	229	229		0	0	5	0	0	0	0	218	0	2
Blue ling	Union and international waters of 2 and 4	0	53	53		0	4	23	4	4	0	0	0	0	14
Blue ling	Union and international waters of 5b, 6, 7	11,378	11,378	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boarfish	Union and international waters of 6, 7 and 8	21,830	21,830	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Capelin	2b	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cod	Skagerrak	3,246	4,069	823	25.4%	2	681	0	17	0	4	0	0	119	0
Cod	Kattegat	494	567	73	14.8%	0	45	0	1	0	0	0	0	27	0
Cod	7a	807	807	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cod	7d	1,368	1,715	347	25.4%	15	0	291	0	0	9	0	0	0	32
Cod	1 and 2b	24,944	26,805	1,861	7.5%	0	0	151	341	0	0	167	803	0	222
Cod	Norwegian waters of 1 and 2	20,024	21,518	1,494	7.5%	0	0	166	180	22	0	201	201	0	700
Cod	4; Union waters of 2a; that part of 3a not covered by the Skagerrak and Kattegat	18,554	23,260	4,706	25.4%	168	963	207	610	0	544	0	0	6	2,208
Cod	6a; Union and international waters of 5b east of 12° 00' W	0	1,735	1,735		3	0	275	26	385	0	0	0	0	1,046

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Cod	6b; Union and international waters of 5b west of 12° 00' W and of 12 and 14	14	74	60	428.6%	0	0	10	1	13	0	0	0	0	36
Cod	7b, 7c, 7e-k, 8, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	0	1,610	1,610		50	0	822	0	650	0	0	0	0	88
Haddock	7a	3,739	3,739	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	4; Union waters of 2a	22,591	22,591	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	3a	1,706	1,706	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	Union and international waters of 5b and 6a	3,226	3,226	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	Union and international waters of 6b, 12 and 14	10,469	10,469	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	7b-k, 8, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	6,317	8,329	2,012	31.9%	22	0	1,341	0	447	0	0	0	0	201
Herring	3a	0	25,415	25,415		0	12,325	0	197	0	0	0	0	12,893	0
Herring	3a (by-catches)	0	6,659	6,659		0	5,692	0	51	0	0	0	0	916	0
Herring	Norwegian waters south of 62° N	670	886	216	32.3%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	216	0
Herring	7a	6,896	6,896	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	Union, Faroese, Norwegian and international waters of 1 and 2	38,315	38,315	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	4, 7d and Union waters of 2a (by-catches)	20,532	13,190	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	Union and Norwegian waters of 4 north of 53° 30' N	174,435	230,755	56,320	32.3%	0	14,514	5,045	9,617	0	12,622	0	0	955	13,566
Herring	4c, 7d (by-catches)	32,014	42,351	10,337	32.3%	2,107	195	2,508	129	0	4,433	0	0	0	964
Herring	Union and international waters of 5b, 6b and 6aN	0	4,170	4,170		0	0	88	466	630	466	0	0	0	2,520
Herring	6aS, 7b, 7c	0	1,630	1,630		0	0	0	0	1,482	148	0	0	0	0
Herring	7g, 7h, 7j and 7k	4,742	4,742	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hake	Union waters of 2a and 4	5,032	4,994	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hake	3a	4,319	4,286	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hake	6 and 7; Union and international waters of 5b; in ternational waters of 12 and 14	80,372	79,762	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hake	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	52,517	52,118	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hake	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	8,281	9,258	977	11.8%	0	0	60	0	0	0	292	625	0	0
Horse mackerel	8c	19,850	18,858	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Horse mackerel	9	94,017	94,017	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	The Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Horse mackerel	Union waters of 2a, 4a; 6, 7a-c, 7e-k, 8a, 8b, 8d and 8e; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 12 and 14	123,702	117,518	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Horse mackerel	Union waters of 4b, 4c and 7d	14,574	12,629	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lemon sole and witch flounder	Union waters of 2a and 4	7,874	7,874	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megrim	7	17,346	18,132	786	4.5%	21	0	286	0	130	0	0	236	0	113
Megrim	Union waters of 2a and 4	2,887	2,887	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megrim	Union and international waters of 5b; 6; international waters of 12 and 14	5,782	5,782	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megrim	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	1,630	1,704	74	4.5%	0	0	33	0	0	0	0	41	0	0
Megrim	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	2,064	1,872	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ling	Union waters of 4	2,902	4,035	1,133	39.0%	7	113	63	70	0	3	0	0	5	871
Ling	Union and international waters of 5	5,196	33	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ling	Union and international waters of 1 and 2	13,103	36	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ling	3a	122	170	48	39.0%	4	26	0	4	0	0	0	0	11	4
Ling	Union and international waters of 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 14	8,772	12,196	3,424	39.0%	13	2	1,006	47	252	0	2	944	0	1,158
Mackerel	3a and 4; Union waters of 2a, 3b, 3c and Subdivisions 22-32	11,352	23,296	11,944	105.2%	217	7,424	683	226	0	688	0	0	2,068	637
Mackerel	Norwegian waters of 2a and 4a	4,991	10,242	5,251	105.2%	0	5,251	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mackerel	6, 7, 8a, 8b, 8d and 8e; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 2a, 12 and 14	127,087	260,813	133,726	105.2%	0	0	5,673	8,508	28,360	12,407	0	9	0	77,993
Mackerel	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	14,542	29,844	15,302	105.2%	0	0	84	0	0	0	2,607	12,612	0	0
Norway lobster	7	23,268	19,784	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	8c	0	2	2		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Norway lobster	Union waters of 2a and 4	24,310	22,103	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	3a	21,639	13,733	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



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Norway lobster	6; Union and international waters of 5b	15,963	15,092	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	6,221	3,878	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	401	401	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	Skagerrak	16,446	16,446	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	Kattegat	2,942	1,705	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	7a	3,503	3,075	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	4; Union waters of 2a; that part of 3a not covered by the Skagerrak and the Kattegat	92,531	92,531	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	7d and 7e	12,873	10,354	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	7f and 7g	2,160	1,662	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	7h, 7j and 7k	0	109	109		7	0	14	0	47	27	0	0	0	14
Plaice	8, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	194	395	201	103.6%	0	0	134	0	0	0	34	34	0	0
Saithe	3a and 4; Union waters of 2a	58,524	58,524	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saithe	6; Union and international waters of 5b, 12 and 14	11,753	11,753	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pollack	7	3,254	12,163	8,909	273.8%	277	0	6,381	0	680	0	0	17	0	1,554
Pollack	8c	131	231	100	76.4%	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	90	0	0
Pollack	6; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 12 and 14	106	397	291	273.8%	0	0	139	0	41	0	0	4	0	106
Pollack	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	840	1,482	642	76.4%	0	0	533	0	0	0	0	109	0	0
Pollack	9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	160	282	122	76.4%	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	118	0	0
Northern prawn	3a	2,461	1,723	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern prawn	Union waters of 2a and 4	0	1,566	1,566		0	1,163	0	0	0	11	0	0	47	345
Redfish	Union and international waters of 5; international waters of 12 and 14 (deep pelagic)	6,736	927	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Redfish	Union and international waters of 5; international waters of 12 and 14 (shallow pelagic)	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7a	414	414	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7d	2,571	2,515	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7e	1,272	1,242	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Common sole	Union waters of 2a and 4	12,791	12,545	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	3a; Union waters of Subdivisions 22-24	502	502	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7b and 7c	24	42	18	75.0%	0	0	3	0	15	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7f and 7g	864	841	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7h, 7j and 7k	311	382	71	22.8%	6	0	12	0	32	9	0	0	0	12
Common sole	8a and 8b	3,967	3,872	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sole	8c, 8d, 8e, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	502	1,072	570	113.5%	0	0	0	0	0	0	356	214	0	0
Sprat	7d and 7e	1,883	2,637	754	40.0%	4	245	53	4	0	53	0	0	0	396
Turbot and brill	Union waters of 2a and 4	8,122	8,122	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tusk	Union waters of 4	257	251	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tusk	Norwegian waters of 4	174	170	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tusk	Union and international waters of 1, 2 and 14	10,451	21	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tusk	3a	32	31	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tusk	Union and international waters of 5, 6 and 7	1,234	1,207	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	Union and international waters of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 8d, 8e, 12 and 14	319,727	319,727	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	Norwegian waters of 2 and 4	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	Faroese waters	2,500	2,500	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	44,064	44,064	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whiting	3a	297	1,232	935	315.0%	0	842	0	0	0	3	0	0	90	0
Whiting	7a	0	727	727		2	0	25	0	419	0	0	0	0	281
Whiting	8	1,613	2,540	927	57.5%	0	0	556	0	0	0	0	371	0	0
Whiting	4; Union waters of 2a	14,854	10,554	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whiting	6; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 12 and 14	0	1,112	1,112		0	0	68	3	324	0	0	0	0	717
Whiting	7b, 7c, 7d, 7e, 7f, 7g, 7h, 7j and 7k	19,738	19,184	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,926,283</b>	<b>2,158,818</b>	<b>312,361</b>	<b>16.2%</b>	<b>3,009</b>	<b>49,914</b>	<b>27,230</b>	<b>20,620</b>	<b>34,052</b>	<b>31,910</b>	<b>3,662</b>	<b>16,689</b>	<b>17,369</b>	<b>106,925</b>

**NEW ECONOMICS FOUNDATION**

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